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A MODERATE AND RESTRAINED
FEDERAL PRODUCT LIABILITY
BILL: TARGETING THE CRISIS
AREAS FOR RESOLUTION
Aaron D. Twerski*
The drive for the enactment of a federal product liability bill
continues unabated. 1 For the sixth time in as many years, the
proponents of legislative reform will lock horns with those who
seek to protect the common law system from encroachment by
the business lobby. 2 The committee hearings over the years have
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1960, Beth Medrash Elyon Research Institute; J.D., 1965, Marquette University; B.S.,
1970, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Jack Panitch and Nora
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1. See S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S218 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985)
[hereinafter cited as S. 100].
2. Federal legislative activity began with the promulgation of the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MUPLA], by the
United States Department of Commerce. The following bills have been introduced in
Congress: H.R. 5626, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 28,678 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. 5626]; H.R. 7000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REc. 7428 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 7000] (virtually identical to MUPLA); H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CoNG. REC. H9529 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 5214];
H.R. 5261, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H9928 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981); S. 2631,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CoNG. REc. S6878 (daily ed. June 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as
S. 2631] (reported with amendments by a unanimous Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation on December 1 (legislative day Nov. 30), 1982. S. REP. No.
670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)); H.R. 2729, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REC. H2328
(daily ed. Apr. 25, 1983) (hereinafter cited as H.R. 2729]; S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REc. S90 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983) [hereinafter cited as S. 44] (S. 44 is virtually
identical to S. 2631, and was reported with amendments by a vote of 13-2 to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on May 23 (legislative day May
21), 1984. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)).
Legislative hearings have generated intense interest from both consumer and industzy
groups. See To Establish Standards and Procedures for Determining Legal and Financial Responsibilities in Product Liability Actions: Hearing on H.R. 5626 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); To Regulate Interstate Commerce by
Providing for a Uniform Product Liability Law, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S.
2631 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as S. 2631 Hearings];
To Regulate Interstate Commerce by Providing for a Uniform Product Liability Law,
and for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1
(1983) and 2d Sess., Part 2 (1984) [hereinafter cited as S. 44 Hearings].
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taken on the aura of an old-time Wes tern. The guys in the
"white hats" (consumer groups) speak of the glories of the common law system. 3 The guys in the "black hats" (the business associations) relate horror stories of righteous corporations driven
out of business because of the ludicrous decisions of common
law courts.• Off-stage some have begun to question the necessity
3. S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 294 (statement of Sybil Shainwald, National Women's Health Network): "S. 44 will not only wipe out present rights but will
also stagnate innovation and development in the field of product liability law. It is the
state courts that have sought to accommodate social needs and to do justice in the face
of an ever-increasing technological society.").See also id. (Part 2) at 389. (statement of
Charles B. O'Reilly, Counsel, on behalf of Asbestos Victims of America):
In the proper exercise of the states' Constitutional right to enact laws for the
protection of their citizens and property, almost all states have adopted product
liability laws. These laws invariably included principles of strict liability.
The legitimate state interest protected by these strict liability principles was
and is the health and welfare of its citizens. The public policy underlying strict
liability principles recognized that strict liability provided the only fair and equitable means to (i) compensate the victims, and (ii) provide financial motivation for industry to consider safety.
Id. at 402 (letter of Hon. Robert Abrams, Att'y Gen. of New York):
Given the preemptive nature of this bill, the broad brush with which it paints,
and its endorsement by an administration supposedly dedicated to a "new federalism", one would be led to believe that it addresses severe problems that are
currently being ignored at the state level. But the truth of the matter is that
while there are indeed some large awards and some variations in results among
jurisdictions, no crisis exists. To the contrary, the present law is necessary to
provide the minimal protection to consumers and should, if anything, be
strengthened.
4. See S. 44 Hearings (Part 2), supra note 2, at 426 (testimony and statement of
Robert D. Rogers, Senior Vice President, Lubbock Mfg. Co.):
In 1975 our company was subject to a rude awakening. We had been in the
business of making and developing systems for the safe handling of hazardous
material for some 45 years. We have had an exemplary record, but we had a tank
trailer that had been 10 years on the road, probably 1 million miles, and it was
involved in a horrible accident. There was evidence the driver had been
speeding.
At that time, the investigation by the State and Federal Government, the National Transportation Department, had proved there was nothing wrong with
our product. However, as a result of that accident, we had a $50 million judgment against us and other defendants. About half of that ended up being
awarded against us, not because the jury intended it that way, but because of
the concept of strict liability and other problems in Texas law at that time.
This accident resulted in our insurance premiums being raised from some
$22,000 to $650,000. It eventually resulted in our going out of business.
Id. (Part 1) at 356-57 (letter of Durant A. Hunter, Vice President, James Hunter Mach.
Co., Inc.):
After witnessing the legal gymnastics which our manufacturing company has
had to perform, I am not surprised at the dearth of aspiring leaders in American
manufacturing. The problems of a manufacturer mirrow [sic] those of society in
the staggering number of lawsuits springing up everywhere. My family has been
involved in the manufacturing business for 136 years. One month ago, James
Hunter Machine Company, Inc. filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, not so much because business conditions are poor, but
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for any legislation.~ The crisis atmosphere, which reached fever
because of a little understood, yet all too familiar concern of American manufacturers-product liability.
. . . We filed Chapter 11 because the current status of product liability laws
made it impossible to continue. After two recent court battles and a quarter of a
million dollars in payments, we had the choice of fighting with lawyers the rest
of our lives or fiiing for reorganization. At the present time we have been named
in 20 suits. A review of only those claims where a specific demand had been
made (only one-half the claims) discloses product liability demands in excess of
$17 million. We know of 11 additional accidents which may result in suits, and
live with the uncertainty of future accidents on which we have no control.
S. 2631 Hearings, supra note 2, at 31-32 (testimony of Arthur Rosen on behalf of Special
Comm. for Workplace Product Liability Reform):
Product liability is a noose over my head. My company presently has four
liability suits pending. The largest is for $21 million. I am presently insured, but
what does that do? Our limit is $500,000. The $21 million claim is for the death
of a person caused by his breaking his company rules. He was running a small
lathe which we sold in 1972 for $2,750. This machine was built in 1944 and had
run adequately for almost 40 years. The person was wearing loose clothing which
caught in the machine while he apparently was climbing over the machine and
kicked or pushed in the clutch.
This lathe is a current state-of-the-art machine. This accident could happen
on a brand new machine. As I also understand the accident, he was operating
the machine during a break in time against company rules. If we lose and the
judgment is rendered over $1 million or even less, that is the end of my company, 26 years of work, the jobs of 25 people.
Id. at 114 (statement of Peter Voss, President, Voss Equip., Inc.):
I do not mind telling the subcommittee I am scared. The specter of a devastating product liability case haunts my business on an almost daily basis. A pending case involving a fellow Pennsylvania material handling equipment distributor is a prime example. The distributor did not sell the truck to the user, nor
control its use. Yet an $18.8 million judgment was just rendered against him and
the manufacturer. If this decision holds, it will more than likely wipe the distributor out of business.
While I am here today to talk about my own product liability problems, my
statement reflects the serious concerns of thousands of other wholesale-distributors throughout the country. For our industry, today's maze of product liability
laws represents an utter lack of control over circumstances which give rise to
liability, the lack of uniformity, and lack of equity and common sense.
Id. at 237 (testimony of William D. Ford, Coalition for Uniform Product Liability Law,
and General Counsel, Colt Indus., Inc.):
In the case of asbestos-related diseases, over 16,000 suits have been filed, and
unknown numbers of future product liability claims may be made. One Yale
University economist has estimated that the cost of these claims may range from
$38 billion to as much as $90 billion.
Not only is the continued existence of some manufacturers of asbestos products threatened, but a number have received qualified opinions from their auditors because of their potential exposure. Some experts have questioned whether
the American property casualty insurance industry can withstand the magnitude
of the claims expected to result.
5. See S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 174-75 (testimony of Hon. Dennis
DeConcini, Senator from Arizona); S. 2631 Hearings, supra note 2, at 17-19 (statement
of Jerry J. Phillips, W.P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee); Kircher,
Federal Product Legislation and Toxic Torts: The Defense Perspective, 28 VILL. L. REV.
1116 (1982-83); Page & Stephens, The Product Liability Insurance "Crisis": Causes,
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pitch several years ago when small manufacturers could not obtain insurance, has abated. 6 It appears unseemly, almost unAmerican, for the federal government to legislate in an area so
long delegated to the states unless there exists a "crisis" of seismic proportions threatening widespread destruction of business
interests. 7 Behind the set in small jam-packed rooms, businessmen load their respective revolvers with live ammunition to be
directed not against consumers but against their brethren should
any of them suggest the deletion of some pet word, phrase, or
section that would otherwise give succor to a particular
industry. 8
In this circus-like atmosphere, relatively few have reflected on
the overall performance of the courts in these years of change. 9
Have there been excesses and if so, are they subject to legislative
correction? If legislation is called for, what should be its gestalt?
How will any proposed legislation mesh with the existing body
of precedent firmly in place in both products and general tort
law? What transaction costs are involved in putting a new product liability code in place? With fifty independent and sovereign
states interpreting a statute, can there be much hope for the
kind of uniformity that will give clear direction to designers and
engineers charged with the responsibility of bringing the product
to the marketplace?
Nostrums, and Cures, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 387 (1984).
6. S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 176-78 (statement of Hon. Bruce Babbitt,
Governor of Arizona); Page & Stephens, supra note 5. But see NATIONAL MACHINE TooL
BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY DIGEST (Mar. 12, 1985) (reporting that product liability insurance premiums, which peaked in 1979, are on the rise again).
7. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1984) (minority views of Ernest F. Hollings, Senator from South Carolina).
8. It is difficult to support this proposition with authority. It is, however, a matter of
common knowledge that the infighting between industry groups has been substantial.
One can only explain the continued insistence to include politically unpalatable provisions dealing with such subjects as product misuse and alterations, unavoidably unsafe
products, and government contract defenses as a reflection of the dogged insistence of
particular industries to build statutory protection for their product line. The proliferation of these and similar "pet" provisions has engendered substantial opposition and
endangered the legislative effort.
9. But see Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980); Henderson,
Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Conscious Design
Choices]; Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design:
Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Defective Product Design]; Owen, Rethinking the Policies of
Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681 (1980); Reed & Watkins, Product Liability Tort Reform: The Case for Federal Action, 63 NEB. L. REV. 389 (1984); Wade, On
Product 'Design Defects' and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551 (1980).
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Legislative standards in an area that is so heavily litigated
must be comprehensible not only to the parties who must live by
them but also to the courts that must utilize them for judging. 10
One must thus ask whether courts can administer the standards
and how they will translate them into jury instructions. Finally,
in an area so heavily politicized by outrageous rhetoric over the
years, 11 the legislation, if it is to succeed, must survive the legislative process. Although two bills have been reported out of
committee in successive years, neither has reached the Senate
floor for a vote. 12 There is every reason to expect that the House
of Representatives will be more hostile than the Senate to legislation that constricts consumer rights. 18 If this year's efforts are
to be more than jousting with windmills, reflections on the kind
of bill likely to draw broad-based support become important.
In this article I have tried to offer a rational, feasible, and politically acceptable solution to the present product liability crisis. To do this, I have first set out the problem. I explain in Part
IO. See Henderson, Process Constraint3 in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 911-14
(1982).
11. See S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 202 (testimony of Karl Asch,
Counsel):
Strict liability is a concept now which has been adopted after years of evolution
in the several States, and it would appear to me from my own unsophisticated
point of view that perhaps this bill would more appropriately be called the manufacturers and distributors and insurance companies' defective products escape
from responsibility and whatever you do, get rid of strict liability act.
S. 2631 Hearings, supra note 2, at 62 (testimony of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director, Public
Citizens Health Research Group): "The past year has seen an unprecedented assault by
business acting as the ventriloquist for Ronald Reagan and his colleagues, designed to ..
. weaken not only Government regulation of health and safety but also to cripple the
flow of information to consumers ... .";Id.at 101 (testimony of James H. Mack, Public
Affairs Director, Nat'! Mach. Tool Builders Ass'n): "Our view is, that in the area of product liability, the experimentation by courts and legislatures in 50 states has created an
end result affecting interstate commerce that looks like it was evolved by Dr.
Strangelove."; Id. at 106 (statement of Emmet W. McCarthy, Vice President, Product
Reliability, Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co.): "Our dilemma, then, is not that we lose a lot of
cases in the courtroom, but that we get sued a lot. The current roulette wheel system
with no stable rules encourages 'sue and hope' syndrome." (emphasis in original); Id. at
281 (testimony of Delby Humphrey, Chairman, Schutt Mfg. Co.): "The time for deciding
the fate of football in America is at hand. The sport will not survive the tremendous
financial pressures imposed upon it by today's litigation."
12. S. 2631, supra note 2, was reported with amendments by a unanimous Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on December 1 (legislative day
November 30), 1982. S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). S. 44, supra note 2,
which is virtually identical to S. 2631, was reported with amendments 13-2 by the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on May 23 (legislative day May
21), 1984. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
13. The current Congress (the 99th) has .54 Republicans and 46 Democrats in the
Senate and 180 Republicans and 225 Democrats in the House. The Democratic majority
in the House will probably be less receptive to legislation constricting consumer rights.
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I how courts have created the crisis by formulating incomprehensible legal standards. In Part II, I examine the difficulties
with assessing punitive damages against a defendant. In Part III,
I discuss the conflict between the torts and workers' compensation systems. In Part IV, I reflect on the need to protect wholesalers and retailers from needless litigation. Part V suggests that
a federal study on the role of damages in product liability litigation be undertaken. I then explain in Part VI why Congress need
only address these five problem areas to resolve the crisis, and in
Part VII, I present my proposed statute.
I.

THE CRISIS OF INCOMPREHENSIBLE STANDARDS

The naysayers notwithstanding, there exists a product liability
crisis that deserves the immediate attention of Congress. The
crisis does not arise from the unavailability of insurance, nor
does it stem from the high cost of that insurance. The source of
the unrest lies in the lack of comprehensibility of the law to
those whose behavior the law seeks to control or modify. This
incomprehensibility either rests in or is exacerbated by the unmanageable open-endedness of the law which makes it unfathomable to courts. Three recent cases will illustrate the point.
A.

Barker-Campbell-Open-Ended Liability

By now everyone probably knows of California's major contribution to the product liability crisis, Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co. 14 One will recall that in Barker the plaintiff was injured at a
construction site while operating a high-lift loader manufactured
by the defendant, Lull Engineering Co. The plaintiff had used
the loader to lift a load of lumber on terrain that sloped sharply
in several directions. The injury occurred when the load was
lifted approximately twenty feet above ground. Due to the sharp
slope, the load of lumber shifted and forced the plaintiff to jump
from the loader. A piece of falling lumber struck him and caused
serious injuries.
The plaintiff contended that the loader had a number of design defects. First, it did not have outriggers to lend stability to
the loader and thus prevent its tipping on difficult terrain. Second, it had no roll bars or seat belts to protect the operator in
14. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
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the event the machine rolled over. Finally, it lacked an automatic locking device on the leveling lever to prevent inadvertent
bumping by the operator.
The Barker court held that a product may be found defective
in design under either of two alternative tests:
First, a product may be found defective in design if .
the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Second, a product may alternatively be found defective in design if . . . the benefits of the challenged design [do not] outweigh the risk of
danger inherent in such design. 111
The mere fact that the California court adopted a "consumer
expectation test" for defect did not pre-ordain that industry
would find it incomprehensible and courts would find it unmanageable. Courts could have narrowed the test's scope to give it
meaning. 16
Nevertheless, in Campbell v. General Motors, Inc. 11 the California Supreme Court fulfilled the expectations of those who
predicted that the adoption of a "consumer expectation" test
would invite jury lawlessness and foster open-ended liability
15. Id. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.
16. A precisely defined and appropriately limited consumer expectation test that focuses exclusively on normal or "core uses" could govern cases not addressed by either
risk-utility analysis or the express warranty provision of U.C.C. § 2-313 (1985). Advertisements, the product's self image, uses to which consumers have put the product in the
past, and other similar intangible factors significantly influence consumer behavior.
Product image, which is a function of these sensory impressions and subsequent expectations, creates an objective expectation that the express warranty does not cover. Furthermore, although the manufacturer's risk-utility balancing takes into account the consumer's perception of product image, the risk-utility formula does not adequately protect
these "soft" product expectations.
As set forth in Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the
Rule of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 861
(1983), strict liability theory provides no place for an independent standard that measures abstract expectations of product performance in terms of a jury's subjective experience. On the other hand, if liability turns on whether the use of the allegedly defective
product fell within the core of uses indigenous to the product and whether the product
failed in that normal use, then the consumer expectation'prong could serve an important
role. The court, however, must decide the threshold question whether the consumer was
using the product according to this normal expected use. If the court determines that the
use falls within the "core uses," then the jury can safely decide whether the product was
defective for that expected use. In those cases where the court finds that the consumer
used this product outside of the norm (but still very possibly foreseeahly) then riskutility analysis provides the only appropriate standard. For an application of this thesis
to Barker and other cases, see id. at 895-930.
17. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
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against manufacturers. 18 In that case, the plaintiff, a sixty-twoyear old woman, boarded a bus manufactured by General Motors. When she first boarded the bus, she sat in a double seat,
but she later decided to sit down on the first .forward-facing single seat on the right side of the bus. The bus had a horizontal
metal "grab bar" attached at shoulder level above the back of
!ach forward-facing seat. Because the plaintiff's seat faced the
3ide of a lateral-facing doubl_e seat she did not have access to a
metal "grab bar." The only handrail directly in front of plaintiff
was the metal armrest attached, at about waist level, to the side
of her seat. Although the bus had a number of vertical poles,
which extended to the ceiling, there were none by the plaintiff's
seat.
As the bus entered the intersection, the plaintiff knew that it
was about to make a right-hand turn. The bus driver turned
sharply, and the bus gained speed. The force propelled the
plaintiff from her seat, and she sought to break her fall by grabbing onto something. Because no guardrails or handrails were
available, the plaintiff suffered serious injuries in the fall. In her
subsequent lawsuit, the plaintiff cited the failure to install a pole
or handrail in the vicinity of the first forward-facing seat as a
design defect.
In reversing the trial court's grant of a nonsuit to General Motors, the California court set forth the requirements for establishing a prima facie case of design defect. Under the Barker
test, the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case if she suggested a design alternative that would have avoided the injury to
her. 19 At that point the burden of proof switched to the defen18. The consumer expectation test essentially maintains that courts should hold liable a manufacturer who leads consumers to believe that a product will perform at a
certain level and then disappoints those expectations. See supra note 16. MUPLA, supra
note 2, provides the rebuttal to this argument. The drafters of MUPLA were among
those who forewarned of the insurmountable problem associated with a consumer expectation test. In explaining the omission of the test from the statute they wrote:
Neither the formula nor the detailed list of the more important evidentiary
items includes what has been called the "consumer expectation test." The reasons for not including it are rooted in both economics and practicality . . . . The
consumer expectation test takes subjectivity in its most extreme end. Each trier
of fact is likely to have a different understanding of abstract consumer expectations. Moreover, most consumers are not familiar with the details of manufacturing process and cannot abstractly evaluate conscious design alternatives.
Id. § 104 analysis; see also Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973).
19. Read literally, the Barker rule requires only that the plaintiff demonstrate that
the product design "proximately caused" the injury. 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455,
143 Cal. Rptr. at 237. Nevertheless, as Professor Gary Schwartz explains, it would be
very poor strategy for a plaintiff to pass up the opportunity of getting the jury to con-
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dant to establish that the product it manufactured met risk-utility standards and did not present "excessive preventable danger."20 The court correctly noted that under the second leg of
the Barker test the plaintiff had established a prima facie case,
and therefore the lower court should not have granted the
nonsuit. 21
Of greater interest is the California court's treatment of the
first prong of Barker which permits the plaintiff to establish her
case if the product failed to satisfy ordinary consumer expectations as to safety. The court found that the plaintiff had established a prim a facie case of defect on this ground as well. In
delineating the proof necessary to establish a prima facie case,
the court did not require expert testimony. 22 Instead, it said that
sider his version of the design issue before the manufacturer presents his pro-product
evidence. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435
(1979). In fact, unless plaintiff's evidence suggesting any design defect is exceptionally
weak, the plaintiff will not use the literal Barker rule because in practice it gives the
defendant first crack at the jury and relegates the plaintiff to the defensive counterattack. See also Birnbaum, supra note 9, at 607-09. Like the plaintiff in Barker, most
plaintiffs will offer several design alternatives in order to establish a tactically effective
prima facie case.
20. 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
21. Many commentators· have criticized the relative ease with which the Barker
plaintiff can make out a prima facie case. See Henderson, Defective Product Design,
supra note 9, at 784-85. See generally Schwartz, supra note 19, at 464-71. Although the
well-advised plaintiff will go beyond the literal Barker rule, see supra note 19, in essence,
the plaintiff can reach the jury merely by alleging some evidence of design alternatives
that might have avoided the injury. Some argue that this presents a problem because the
court cannot direct a verdict for the defendant in cases that are simply too fragile to go
to a jury. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
22. The court said:
Here, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to have the case submitted to the
jury on this theory as well. Not only did she testify about the accident (her use
of the product), but she also introduced photographic evidence of the design
features of the bus. This evidence was sufficient to establish the objective conditions of the product. The other essential aspect of this test involves the jurors'
own sense of whether the product meets ordinary expectations as to its safety
under the circumstances presented by the evidence. Since public transportation
is a matter of common experiepce, no expert testimony was required to enable
the jury to reach a decision on this part of the Barker inquiry.
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive what testimony an "expert" could provide.
The thrust of the first Barker test is that the product must meet the safety
expectations of the general public as represented by the ordinary consumer, not
the industry or a government agency. "[O}ne can hardly imagine what credentials a witness must possess before he can be certified as an expert on the issue
of ordinary consumer expectations." (Schwartz, Understanding Products Liability, 67 CAL. L. REV. 435, 480 (1979).)
The quantum of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case of design defect under the first prong of Barker cannot be reduced to an easy formula. However, if the product is one within the common experience of ordinary consumers,
it is generally sufficient if the plaintiff provides evidence concerning (1) his or
her use of the product; (2) the circumstances surrounding the injury; and (3) the
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"it is generally sufficient if the plaintiff provides evidence concerning (1) his or her use of the product; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the injury; and (3) the objective features of the
product which are relevant to an evaluation of its safety." 23
To understand the broad sweep of this decision, one must reflect on the fact that the "consumer expectation" test operates
independently from the risk-utility test. 24 Thus, even if the defendant had carried its burden of proof by establishing that to
have placed a pole adjacent to the plaintiff's seat would have
created greater dangers than it would have prevented, the plaintiff would still have won if the jury found that the product failed
to meet the consumer's expectations. One searches in vain for
any standard that gives content to the consumer expectation
test in this case. The plaintiff's testimony that she rides buses
regularly and did not expect that this bus would cause her injury
appears sufficient to make out a prima facie case of design
defect.
The Barker and Campbell decisions have created a crisis of
comprehensibility for responsible manufacturers. To be told that
objective features of the product which are relevant to an evaluation of its
safety. That evidence was provided in this case. Therefore, appellant was entitled to a jury determination concerning whether the bus satisfied ordinary consumer expectations.
32 Cal. 3d at 126-27, 649 P.2d at 232-33, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
One can question the court's reliance on Professor Gary Schwartz's analysis of the role
of the expert witness in this context. Professor Schwartz rejects the use of the consumer
expectation test as an independent liability standard (except under narrowly circumscribed conditions) because it raises prospects of "haphazard impressionistic jury decision-making." Schwartz, supra note 19, at 480. While Schwartz takes issue with an "expert" testifying on matters of the victim's pre-injury expectations, he also questions the
reliability and admissibility of the consumer-victim's after-the-fact testimony that the
product failed to meet his expectations. Id. Moreover, Schwartz disagrees with the theory that the jurors themselves represent ordinary consumers who can identify consumer
expectations, id., which appears to be the premise underlying the Campbell result.
23. 32 Cal. 3d at 127, 649 P.2d at 233, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
24. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38. The
court's language is unmistakenly clear:
A product may be found defective in design so as to subject a manufacturer to
strict liability for resulting injuries, under either of two alternative tests. First, a
product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably forseeable manner. Second, a product may
alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Campbell, 32 Cal. 3d at 118, 649 P.2d at 227, 184 Cal.
Rptr. at 894, where the California court reiterates: "In Barker, two alternative tests were
established for determining whether a product is defectively designed."
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the defendant must bear the burden· of proof on risk-utility
presents a serious problem; it virtually wipes out the possibility
of winning a design defect case on directed verdict because the
party with the burden of proof rarely wins on directed verdict. 211
In all but the utterly frivolous design case, the defendant will
have to face the vagaries of a jury. It then adds insult to injury
to tell the defendant that, even if it carries that onerous burden,
the plaintiff will have a second bite at the apple by submitting
the case to the jury with nothing more than the testimony of the
plaintiff that as an ordinary consumer she did not expect to be
injured. Manufacturers have considerable justification for the
belief that, in California, they cannot successfully defend design
defect cases. 26

25. See Schwartz, supra note 19. Professor Schwartz, in criticizing the Barker burden-of-proof rule, states:
[O]ne simply cannot talk meaningfully about a risk-benefit defect in a product
design until and unless one has identified some design alternative (including any
design omission) that can serve as the basis for a risk-benefit analysis. If the
Barker rule is read literally, however, it fails to require the plaintiff even to
point to an alternative of this sort. Within the burden-of-proof jurisprudence,
one respected canon is that the burden shall be placed on the party who has
control of or access to the relevant information; that is the canon upon which
Barker properly relies. But another respectable canon is that the burden-ofproof should not be placed so as to require a party to prove a negative. This
canon the Barker rule violates.

Id. at 468; see also Henderson, Defective Product Design, supra note 9, at 784-85: "Directed verdicts for defendants, traditionally an important protection against arbitrary
jury decisions in cases of doubtful merit, will occur even less frequently under the Barker
[burden-of-proof] rule literally applied than they occur under the existing majority rule."
The need to control product design litigation by directed verdict practice is discussed
in Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect
Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
521 (1982).
26. See Schwartz, supra note 19. Professor Schwartz, in discussing cases where the
victim has suffered severe injuries but the facts supporting design defects are weak,
states:
Given the frailty of the liability claim, without Barker the plaintiff might well
succumb to summary judgment or a directed verdict. Under Barker, however,
once the burden of proof has been shifted by the plaintiff's limited showing, only
in a few cases will the manufacturer be able to offer the kind of unmistakable
evidence that overcomes the defect presumption as a matter of law.

Id. at 470; see Twerski, National Product Liability Legislation: In Search of the Best of
All Possible Worlds, 18 IDAHO L. REV. 411, 412 (1982).
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O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.-The Assault on Market
Decision Making

The New Jersey Supreme Court has led the nation in pushing
back the frontiers of product liability law. 27 Commentators have
questioned the wisdom of these changes, particularly the holding
in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. 28 which imposed
strict liability on the defendant for failing to warn of dangers
that were technologically and scientifically unknowable at the
time the product was sold. 29 Similarly, manufacturers point to
Beshada as irrefutable evidence that common law courts have
lost touch with reality. 30 Prior to Beshada several decisions contained language indicating that a manufacturer would be
27. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) (finding
manufacturers of prescription drugs not immune to strict liability; deeming reasonably
prudent manufacturer to know of information generally available or reasonably obtainable at time of distribution; and holding that defendant bears burden in strict liability
failure-to-warn cases of proving that information was not reasonably obtainable at time
of distribution); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983) (holding
state-of-the-art evidence relevant to risk-utility analysis and therefore admissible in
strict liability cases involving design defects, but plaintiff is not required to prove an
alternative design to make out prima facie case); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (disallowing state-of-the-art defense in failure-towarn cases); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979)
(rejecting assumption of risk industrial design cases); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J.
402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) (rejecting contributory negligence in industrial design cases);
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (finding liability in salesservice hybrid transactions); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental, 45 N.J. 434, 212
A.2d 769 (1965) (holding lessor strictly liable); Santor v. A & R Karagheusian, Inc., 44
N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (granting recovery in strict liability for economic loss); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (invalidating disclaimer of warranty where contract of adhesion present).
28. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
29. See Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment K and for Strict
Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 877-82 (1983); Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV., 796, 824-25 (1983); Schwartz,
The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable
Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892, 901-05 (1983); Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability
of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734 (1983); Comment,
Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product
Defects, 71 GEo. L.J. 1635 (1983); Birnbaum & Wrubel, N.J. High Court Blazes New
Path in Holding a Manufacturer Liable, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 24, 1983, at 24, col. 1; see also
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (1983) (limiting
Beshada rule to "ordinary" products cases; New Jersey law does not require the imputation of time-of-trial knowledge in failure-to-warn cases attending the use of pharmaceutical drugs). But see Placitella & Darnell, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.:
Evolution or Revolution in Strict Products Liability?, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 801 (1983).
30. See, e.g., S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 91 (statement of James Sales)
("Under Beshada of New Jersey and Azarello of Pennsylvania, it matters not that a 1940
automobile, if it is the subject of a lawsuit today, will be judged by the standards of
engineering knowledge available in 1983. To me that is absurd.").
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charged with knowledge of risk whether or not reasonable conduct on its part would have revealed the information. 31 Nevertheless, not even these pre-Beshada cases maintained that liability would attach for failing to provide warnings based on
scientific or technological information that was unavailable at
the time the defendant marketed the product. ·
In O'Brien v. Muskin Corp. 32 the New Jersey Supreme Court
strengthened the position of the proponents of legislative reform
by permitting the jury to decide that a rather ordinary product
could be declared defective even though the plaintiff presented
no evidence of the feasibility of an alternative design that would
have minimized the risk. O'Brien. involved an outdoor, aboveground swimming pool made out of an embossed vinyl liner
which fit within an outer structure and was filled with water to a
depth of approximately three and one-half feet. On the outer
wall of the pool, the manufacturer placed a decal that warned
"DO NOT DIVE" in letters roughly one-half inch high. Despite
the warning, the plaintiff, a twenty-three year old, dove into the
pool. As his outstretched hands hit the vinyl-lined bottom, they
slid apart, and he struck his head on the bottom of the pool,
sustaining serious injuries. The complaint alleged that the manufacturer was strictly liable for failing to warn adequately about
the dangers of diving and for using the highly slippery vinyl .
liner.
The trial judge permitted the jury to determine the adequacy
of the warning. Yet, the judge took the design defect issue from
the jury because the plaintiff's expert admitted that he knew of
no above-ground pool that made use of any material other than
vinyl as a liner, even though the expert criticized the use of
vinyl. Thus, the court found the absence of testimony as to a
viable alternative sufficient grounds to remove the design issue
from the case.
The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed. In sending the case
back for retrial on the design defect allegation, the court noted
that:
The evaluation of the utility of a product also involves
31. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 239 (1978); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, 87 N.J. 229, 239, 432 A.2d 925, 930
(1981); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 163, 386 A.2d 816, 821 (1978),
overruled on other grounds, Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 177,
406 A.2d 140, 153 (1979); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 494-95, 525 P.2d
1033, 1037-38 (1974).
32. 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
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the relative need for that product; some products are essentials, while others are luxuries. A product that fills a
critical need and can be designed in only one way should
be viewed differently from a luxury item. Still other
products, including some for which no alternative exists,
are so dangerous and of such little use that under the
risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer would bear the cost
of liability of harm to others. That cost might dissuade a
manufacturer from placing the product on the market,
even if the product has been made as safely as possible.
Indeed, plaintiff contends that above-ground pools with
vinyl liners are such products and that manufacturers
who market those pools should bear the cost of injuries
they cause to foreseeable users. 33
Thus, the court concluded that a case for design defect could go
to the jury even where the plaintiff failed to prove the existence
of alternative safer designs. It maintained that "[e]ven if there
are no alternative methods of making bottoms for above-ground
pools, the jury might have found that the risk posed by the pool
outweighed its utility." 34
O'Brien reaches an astounding result. I do not quarrel with
the court's contention that some products may present dangers
so extreme that manufacturers should remove them from the
market even if there exist no alternative designs that would reduce their dangerousness. 35 Instead, the application of that principle to the facts of O'Brien troubles me. O'Brien involved an
above-ground swimming pool, a product that enjoys immense
popularity throughout the country. Although the plaintiff contended that the manufacturer failed adequately to warn about
the risks of diving into the pool, the court submitted the design
defect question to the jury as well. Because the design and warning claims can stand independent of each other, one must conclude that, even if the manufacturer had provided adequate
warnings, the design defect allegation would stand. In short,
courts may rely on O'Brien to declare defective in design a product used in millions of American homes even though the manufacturer provides adequate warning of the risks involved in its
misuse and the plaintiff fails to present any evidence of an alternative design that would render the product safer.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 184, 463 A.2d at 306.
Id. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306.
See id. at 184, 463 A.2d at 306.
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Although the court admitted that imposing upon the manufacturer the cost of compensation for injuries might well lead it
to remove the product from the market, 36 the court still saw no
reason to remove decision-making power from the jury. If courts
abandon responsibility for rule making and permit cases as farfetched as O'Brien to go to juries, then one can only expect the
business community to reject the common law as an acceptable
decision-making process in product liability cases. Ultimately,
O'Brien rejects the notion that the market, as an indicator of
consumer values, provides an appropriate basis for concluding
that widespread acceptance of a product indicates the social importance of a product or society's willingness to accept the risk
the product presents, or both. 37
Moreover, in a design defect case, the plaintiff challenges an
entire product line. Consequently, the defendant could face
countless lawsuits without any realistic defense. This presents a
frightening liability picture for even the most conscientious
manufacturer. Because O'Brien permits a jury to condemn at
whim a common product that a manufacturer has honestly marketed and whose design it cannot improve, the New Jersey Supreme Court has added to the crisis of comprehensibility that
stems from a lack of standards. Manufacturers cannot intelligently respond to the dictates of O'Brien, and courts cannot
guide juries to fair results utilizing its teaching.

C.

Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.-Confusion
Compounded

The application of strict liability principles to design defect
and failure-to-warn cases has caused great confusion almost
from the outset. 38 Unlike production defect cases, for which the
manufacturer's "good" product provides the standard against
36. See id.
37. For an economic analysis of O'Brien, see Note, Strict Products Liability and the
Risk-Utility Test for Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 2045
(1984). In it the author points out that the O'Brien court has rejected the assumption of
fully informed and rational consumers. Rejecting this assumption allows the court to
reach the conclusion that consumers are buying more of the product than they would if
they fully understood the product's risks. On a theoretical level the Note's author agrees
with the O'Brien court's theory of court-enforced safety despite market demand. On a
practical level, however, the Note's author predicts that few products on the market have
negative net utility and that the O'Brien holding will give to juries many cases that they
will probably decide incorrectly due to the emotional appeal of plaintiff's severe injuries.
38. See Wade, supra note 29, at 741-45.
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which to measure defect, 39 the design and failure-to-warn cases
require courts to create their own standard. 40 By common acknowledgement, risk-utility balancing became the test utilized
to determine the availability of an alternative design that would
not render the product "unreasonably. dangerous." 41
39. Henderson, Conscious Design Choices, supra note 9, at 1544; Phillips, A Synopsis
of the Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 317, 345 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Phillips, Synopsis of the Developing Law]. See Phillips, The Standard for
Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. C1N. L. REV. 101, 105 & n.22
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Phillips, Determining Defectiveness]. Section 104(A) of
MUPLA, supra note 2, has incorporated the standard that measures a production defect
against the manufacturer's internal design specifications. This standard is replete in the
case law. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 236 (1978); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643, 655-56, 641 P.2d 353,
362 (1982); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491, 525 P.2d 1033, 1035-36
(1974).
40. Henderson, Conscious Design Choices, supra note 9, at 1547.
41. Most of the recent literature in products liability has focused on the reasonableness test and the appropriateness of risk-utility balancing as a method for establishing
defects. See Birnbaum, supra note 9; Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the
Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643 (1978); Henderson, Conscious Design Choices, supra
note 9; Henderson, Defective Product Design, supra note 9; Henderson, Expanding the
Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept]; Henderson, Manufacturer's
Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REV.
625 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Henderson, Proposed Statutory Reform]; Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109
(1976); Keeton, Products. Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
CuM. L. REv. 293 (1979); Phillips, Determining Defectiveness, supra note 39; Schwartz,
supra note 19; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings
in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Use and Abuse of
Warnings]; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products
Liability: From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives]; Wade, supra
note 9.
Most courts have adopted risk-utility analysis as either an exclusive or an alternative
ground of liability. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 107173 (4th Cir. 1974) (exclusive ground); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885
(Alaska 1979) (alternative ground); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573
P.2d 443, 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-39 (1978) (alternative ground); Lewis v. Bucyrus-Erie, Inc.,.622 S.W.2d 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (exclusive ground); Michalko v. Cooke
Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 394, 451 A.2d 179, 183 (1982) (exclusive ground);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 170-71, 406 A.2d 140, 150-51
(1979) (alternative ground); Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 266-67, 461 N.E.2d 864, 866,
473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (1984) (exclusive ground); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59
N.Y.2d 102, 108-09, 450 N.E.2d 204, 208-09, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402-03 (1983) (exclusive
grounds); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78, 384
N.Y.S.2d ll5, 121 (1976) (exclusive ground); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61,
67-68, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978) (exclusive ground); Turner v. General Motors Corp.,
584 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. 1979) (exclusive ground); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 162 W. Va. 857, 887-90, 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (1979) (exclusive ground). Federal
statutes also use the reasonableness concept in setting design standards. See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(0 (1982); Consumer Prod-
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Once courts focused on a risk-utility assessment, the question
arose whether strict liability perceptibly differed from negligence. The difference between the two is the time _when information became available to the manufacturer or seller. Negligence,
with its focus on the conduct of the manufacturer, would impose
liability where a reasonable manufacturer knew or should have
known of certain information. 42 Strict liability, however, would
impose liability even though a reasonable manufacturer would
not have had access to information that later became available. 43
Thus, courts applying a strict liability standard would deem a
product "unreasonably dangerous" even though the manufac-.
turer had acted reasonably in designing and marketing the
product.
This attribution to the manufacturer of knowledge that it
could not have acquired using reasonable care has created enormous apprehension in the business community."" Courts and legislatures have responded to this concern by creating "state of
the art" defenses to the strict liability rule. •11 Although the foruct Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056(a), 2058(c) (1982).
42. A number of courts have predicated liability in design defect and failure-to-warn
cases on basic negligence principles. See, e.g., Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1971);
Schwartz v. General Motors Corp., 375 Mass. 628, 378 N.E.2d 61 (1978); Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376,348 N.E.2d 571,384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); Kennedy v. Custom
Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176 (1978); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories,
514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974).
43. Although many courts have indicated that the strict liability standard governs
design defect and failure-to-warn cases, a majority of them view strict liability in foreseeability terms. Using a "strict liability" standard, the following courts have predicated
liability on the failure to utilize risk information or technology only if this knowledge was
available at the time of sale. See, e.g., Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192
(4th Cir. 1982); Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059, 1063-64
(Alaska 1979); Woodhill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980); Hunt
v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585, 589 (La. 1980); Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 27071, 461 N.E.2d 864, 868-69, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 382 (1984); Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 92
Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979). Other courts reject the knowledge at the time-of-sale
standard as being indistinguishable from negligence; they adopt a more absolute view of
strict liability. At this end of the spectrum, the defendant is held liable for after-acquired knowledge, even though he may have acted reasonably when he designed the
product without regard to the availability of critical information or technology. See, e.g.,
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 435, 573 P.2d 443, 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225, 239-40 (1978); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. ·Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-09, 447
A.2d 539, 546-49 (1982); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 395, 451
A.2d 179, 183 (1982); Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip. Co., 278 Or. 395, 398-400, 564
P.2d 674,676 (1977); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 497-98, 525 P.2d 1033,
1039 (1974); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977).
44. 4 REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY-LEGAL STUDY
101 (1977).
45. See, e.g., Sturm Ruger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979) ("While
not, strictly speaking, a defense in a products liability action, state of the art may be
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mulation of these "state of the art" rules differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,46 in the end and for all practical purposes,
the defense reinstates the negligence standard as the operative
rule in all cases where it applies.
The term "state of the art" came to mean all things to all people.'17 Some courts used it to describe various kinds of knowledge48 while others applied it to the different standards for imconsidered in determining whether a product is defective."); Bell Bonfil Memorial Blood
Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 126 n.14 (Colo. 1983) ("When the [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) § 402 A] comment k exception is asserted, establishing that the
product's manufacture, design, and warning conformed to the state of the art is merely a
part of the defendant's burden."); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 183, 463 A.2d
298, 305 U983) ("Although state-of-the-art evidence may be dispositive on the facts of a
particular case, it does not constitute an absolute defense apart from risk-utility analysis."). The following statutes have been enacted: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (Supp.
1980); Cow. REv. STAT. § 13-21-403(a) (Supp. 1984); IND. CooE § 33-1-1.5-4(b)(4)(1983);
Kv. REV. STAT. § 411.310(2) (Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 182 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-28-105(b) (1980); WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 7.72.050(1) (Supp. 1985).
46. Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 7.72.050(1) (Supp. 1985) (allowing consideration of evidence of industry custom, technological feasibility, or compliance with nongovernmental or legislative regulatory standards by trier of fact) with Kv. REv. STAT. §
411.310(2) (Supp. 1984) (authorizing presumption of no defect upon proof of manufacturer's adherence to state of the art in design, manufacturing methods, and testing ) and
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (1982) (authorizing affirmative defense upon proof that
product plans, manufacturing methods, inspection, testing, and labelling conformed with
state of the art).
47. Dean Wade urges that the "chameleon-like" term should be dropped from use
because "its meanings are so diverse and so often confused." Wade, supra note 29, at
751. Although most jurisdictions have misapplied "state of the art," if properly defined it
has great utility. In response to the need for increased judicial control of design defect
litigation, I proposed a multifactor duty analysis to replace single factor no-duty rules.
See Twerski, supra note 25. While the single-issue test served to insulate the defendant
manufacturer, an overall duty consideration that focuses on tangible policy factors aids
the court in directing verdicts in cases that should not go to a jury. As one factor in this
overall duty analysis, "state of the art" represents a useful screening device. Thus, in
cases where substantial time has passed from manufacture to injury, courts should be
sensitive to: (a) change in societal values, (b) the quality of expert testimony, and (c) the
advanced state of knowledge and technology. These considerations should weigh on the
decision to direct a verdict for the manufacturer. Id. at 556-61.
48. Courts and commentators have used "state of the art" to describe at least three
different kinds of problems. In the controversy over the fairness and wisdom of applying
strict liability in design defect and failure-to-warn cases, "state of the art" refers to the
limited knowledge of risk and technology available at the time the manufacturer first
made the product or placed it into the stream of commerce. By asserting this defense, a
manufacturer may limit the imputation of after-acquired knowledge and time-of-trial
technological advances. Those who applaud this limitation claim that it is unjust to apply a risk-utility analysis with the benefit of hindsight. See Stonehocker v. General ·Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 156-157 (4th Cir. 1978); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d
1176, 1184-86 n.24 (5th Cir. 1971). On the other hand, plaintiffs argue that it is virtually
impossible to ascertain the exact state _of a defendant's knowledge of risk and technology
and that the "state of the art" as described forces them to pinpoint knowledge and foreseeability with unfair exactitude. See Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d
809, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1974); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406
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plementing knowledge" 0 in order to improve a product. In a
masterful treatment of the subject, Dean Wade identified three
separate kinds of knowledge that could be relevant to risk-utility
balancing: (1) knowledge of dang_er, hazards, or risks that arise
from normal use of a product that a manufacturer could have
learned of after marketing the product; (2) scientific and technological developments that have occurred since marketing that
could make the product safer; and (3) product use and misuse
that a manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen at the
time of marketing but that the actual experience of consumer
use has made available. 110
Dean Wade notes that courts differ sharply about whether
they should impute knowledge of dangers arising from normal
use to the defendant. 111 As to the issue of technological and economic feasibility, the issue most often dubbed "state of the art,"
most courts appear unwilling to impute post-marketing knowledge. Dean Wade notes that "while product hazards exist independently of whether anyone knows about them, feasibility is,
almost by definition, a function of contemporary perceptions
A.2d 140 (1979). See generally Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1981); O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State
of the Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv. 627 (1978); Twerski,
supra note 25, at 556-61. For additional constructions of "state of the art" see infra note
49.
49. Courts use "state of the art" terminology to describe the complex interplay between design alternatives and the burden of proof in design litigation. How practically
feasible must the plaintiff show his design alternative to be? The plaintiff's expert will
ordinarily support the plaintiff's theory that the manufacturer could have designed the
product in a way that minimized risk without destroying utility. The courts, however,
divide on how much attention the plaintiff needs to give state-of-the-art issues. Manufacturers urge that the plaintiff must address in the prima facie case the practicality,
cost, and marketability of the alternative he offers. See O'Donnell, supra note 48, at 64653. For an in-depth analysis of the role of experts in products liability litigation, see
Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability
Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303 (1974).
Manufacturers also claim "state of the art" when issues of changing societal standards
and increased consumer expectations are evident. Applied in this context, the "state of
the art" bears a strong resemblance to a custom defense. In both cases, defendants point
to socially accepted industry practices in an effort to justify its design. Defendants argue,
with varied success, that courts cannot require industry to set standards that do not
correspond with society's needs and attitudes. Thus, even when plaintiffs present an economically and technologically feasible alternative design that is demonstrably safer, defendants argue that liability should not attach because at the relevant time of manufacture or distribution, society did not demand the proposed level of safety. See Wade,
supra note 29, at 750 & n.59. Once again, courts should determine issues of changing
societal norms, as well as the aforementioned knowledge of risk and technology and
shifting burdens of proof. See Twerski, supra note 25, at 556-61 for discussion and additional sources.
50. Wade, supra note 29, at 751-53.
51. Id. at 757.
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and priorities." 52 Nonetheless, he finds no justification for distinguishing between the various kinds of knowledge. 53 An examination of Carter u. Johns-Manville Corp. 54 serves to illustrate
the logical inconsistencies these meaningless distinctions create.
In Carter, plaintiff's decedent (Elbert Blackwell) brought suit
against Johns-Manville, the manufacturer of the asbestos used
as insulation material in a shipyard where he worked from 1942
to 1946. The use of defendant's product exposed Blackwell to
fiber dust from which he contracted a fatal case of mesothelioma. The plaintiff brought suit on both failure-to-warn and design defect grounds and, for the purpose of perfecting an appeal,
the parties stipulated "that the defendant did not know of the
dangers involved in using its products, nor could it have reasonably known of them or foreseen them, even held to the knowledge and skill of an expert. " 55
The Texas District Court found that, under state law, it could
impute after-acquired knowledge in a defective design case but
not in a failure-to-warn case. 56 The court found that Texas
adopted strict liability in design defect litigation. 57 It reasoned
that if strict liability did not require the imputation of afteracquired knowledge, there would be no difference between negligence and strict liability. 58
The court then examined Texas law on the issue of failure to
warn. Here, the court found that Texas had retained a basic
negligence rule. 59 One might attribute this result to the Texas
court's uneasiness about imposing a duty on the manufacturer to
warn about information that it could not reasonably obtain. The
matter did not, however, end at this point. Having concluded
that the plaintiff could not pursue the failure-to-warn claim
52. Id. at 757-58.
53. Id. at 757-59.
54. 557 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
55. Id. at 1318.
56. Id. at 1319.
57. Id. at 1318-19.
58. The court noted that:
[T]he "prudent manufacturer" test used in strict liability cases already incorporates the "reasonable man" test used in negligence cases. The difference is that
in a strict liability case, the defendant's awareness of the danger is hypothesized, and therefore the plaintiff need not prove that the danger was foreseeable. To permit the defendant to defeat a strict liability claim by proving that it
could not have foreseen the danger, in effect by proving that it was not negligent, would fly in the face of the entire history of the evolution of strict liability
in tort.
Id. at 1319 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
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under strict liability, the court returned to con_sider the design
defect claim. It observed that in order to perform a risk-utility
analysis, a court must investigate not only engineering changes
that could have rendered the product safer but also whether a
warning could have helped to reduce the product's
dangerousness.
In essence, the court viewed a warning as "one of a product's
many design attributes that weigh in the balance of dangers
against utility to determine whether the product is unreasonably
dangerous." 6 ° Consequently, it found that "[a] manufacturer
. . . [could] defend a strict liability claim based on defective design by showing that a warning accompanied the product that
reduced its dangers." 61 The court, however, explicitly rejected
the notion that a manufacturer could introduce hypothetical
warnings that might have made the product safer and then excuse the failure to provide these warnings on its justifiable ignorance of the risk information. To permit this, the court maintained, would "reinject the element of foreseeability into the
theory of strict liability for defective design, and revert that theory into one of negligence. " 62
Finally, the court turned its attention to the "state of the art"
question. A leading Texas case, Bailey v. Boatland of Houston, 63
had firmly established "state of the art" as a legitimate defense
to a strict liability design defect claim. The Carter court explained that this state-of-the-art defense would permit the defendant to argue that the unavailability of technology or the economic infeasibility of implementing an alternate design
precluded it from making its original design safer. 6 ' Nevertheless, under the state-of-the-art defense, a manufacturer defending in a failure-to-warn case could not argue that it provided no
warning because it had not known of the danger against which
the consumer should have taken precaution. Instead, the court
maintained that:

[t]he manufacturer would have to claim that,
danger was in fact foreseeable, it was not
have included a warning on the product, in
did not exist the technological capability to
so, at least not without making the product
60. Id. at 1320.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
64. 557 F. Supp. at 1320.

even if the
feasible to
that there
have done
less useful
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to society. Foreseeability is know-of; true state of the art
is know-how. Know-of has no place in a strict liability
case based on defective design. 65
We have now come full circle. To succeed under a state-ofthe-art defense a defendant need only establish that it incorporated into its product all technologically and economically feasible safety measures. Consequently, a manufacturer must supply
a warning only when feasible. 66 The feasibility of a warning,
however, depends on knowledge of the risk against which the
warning seeks to advise the user, and in a design defect case the
court cannot inquire into knowledge of the risk or foreseeability
of the harm. Thus, the court is caught in a classic Catch-22 from
which it cannot extricate itself.
One can argue that the court's dilemma stemmed from the
Texas courts' failure to apply strict liability in both design and
failure-to-warn cases. With very few exceptions, 67 however,
courts have strongly resisted applying strict liability in the pure
failure-to-warn case. 68 If Texas erred here, then so have all the
other courts that have refused to follow Beshada.
Some commentators have taken the position that Carter erred
in treating the warning issue as negligence when the claim was
failure to warn and as strict liability when the claim was based
65. Id. at 1320-21 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 1320.
67. The following courts have applied strict liability in a failure-to-warn case or have
approved of its application in dicta: Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 246-47
(3d Cir. 1984) (applying New Jersey law); Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499
F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974) (applying Montana law); Hamilton & Hardy, 37 Colo. App.
375, 384-85, 549 P.2d 1099, 1107 (1976); Beshada v. Johns-Manville, 90 N.J. 191, 204-05,
447 A.2d 539, 546-47 (1982); Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 402,
451 A.2d 179, 187 (1982); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 240, 432 A.2d
925,931 (1981); Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 258 Pa. Super. 59, 78,391 A.2d 1074, 1083
(1978); Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 820-22, 579 P.2d 940, 945-97 (1978),
modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).
68. The following decisions reflect the majority view. See, e.g., Hardy v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 344 (5th Cir. 1982) (asbestos insulation); Karjala v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Minnesota
law) (asbestos insulation); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1090
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (asbestos insulation ); Cover v. Cohen,
61 N.Y.2d 261, 274-75, 461 N.E.2d 864,871,473 N.Y.S.2d 378,385 (1984) (throttle return
spring in automobile); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 198, 423 N.E.2d
831, 836-37 (1981) (oral contraceptives); Bristol-Meyers v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804
(Tex. 1978) (ototoxic pharmaceutical drugs). It is worth noting that the duty to warn is
an ongoing process that does not terminate upon manufacture and delivery. Many courts
apply a negligence standard to defective warning in the first instance and continue to
impose a duty on manufacturers to update their warnings and notify retailers and consumers of dangers that become known after distribution.
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on design defect. 69 They argue that courts should treat a failureto-warn claim as based in negligence and ought not to impute
after-acquired knowledge merely because the warning issue is
made part of the design defect claim. 70 Although this contention
has merit, the authors fail to recognize the soundness of the
court's analysis. One cannot evaluate a product's design by simply inquiring into the proposed design changes that a manufacturer could have made.
Warnings play a legitimate role in risk-utility analysis. 71
Sometimes a warning alone will reduce the probability of the
harm sufficiently to render an otherwise dangerous product reasonably safe. In other instances, a manufacturer will have to
combine design changes and warnings to achieve reasonable
safety. There is just no way to artificially distinguish between
·69. See Wheeler & Kress, A Comment on Recent Developments in Judicial Imputation of Post-Manufacture Knowledge in Strict Liability Cases, 6 J. PROD. LIAB. 127, 12836 (1983); cf. Wade, supra note 29, at nn.50-52 and accompanying text.
70. Wheeler and Kress argue that Carter introduces imputed knowledge into the failure-to-warn claim without sound justification. Wheeler & Kress, supra note 69, at 145.
The authors contend that there are good reasons for refusing to impute time-of-trial
knowledge when the "defect" is a failure to warn and criticize Carter for its superficial
analysis. Id. at 144-45.
Carter creates an initial problem by affording the plaintiff a unique advantage when
the court imputes knowledge to the defendant in the failure-to-warn case. Unlike design
modifications in which the prohibitive costs may offset the benefit of a safer alternative,
warnings cost little and generally do not impede the product's function. Almost any risk
reduction attributable to a warning will therefore make the warning cost effective on
risk-utility balancing. Once the court removes the foreseeability question, liability will be
greatly extended. The effect of strict liability on the food and chemical industries is especially troubling. While it is very difficult to change the chemical structure without
seriously impairing the function of food, pharmaceuticals and other chemicals, courts can
apply post-manufacture knowledge of risk to a written warning with relative ease. Id. at
137-39.
Moreover, strict liability in failure-to-warn will have a disproportionate impact because generally there exists a greater likelihood of discovery of post-manufacture risks
for chemical and food products than for machines. Id. at 141-42. The authors attribute
this to naturally longer discovery periods between exposure to the product and manifestation of injury, the accelerating growth of knowledge in the field of biochemistry as
compared to well-understood engineering principles; and the relative difficulty of postsale warning and recall in the food and chemical industries. Id. at 142-43.
71. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Use and Abuse of Warnings, supra
note 41, at 517:
In short, when calculating the burden of precaution which is part of the riskutility calculus, it will be necessary to focus on costs other than the cost of label
printing. The efficacy of warning is a societal cost of substantial importance.
Thus, it will not be possible for the courts to rely on warnings alone to ensure
product safety. The range of risks is so broad, and the type of consumer response so varied, that the courts cannot avoid asking "what is a reasonably safe
product" or "how much safety is enough." The answers will sometimes lie with
an adequate warning, sometimes with redesign of the product, but most often
with warning and design blended together to give an adequate level of safety.
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warning and design parameters. A design change in and of itself
may accomplish greater safety by making it more difficult for
the dangerous event to take place and by simultaneously highlighting the dangerous nature of the product, thus calling the
user's attention to whatever product danger remains. Thus a single design change may serve both engineering safety and communicating danger functions. A tamper-proof cap on a bottle
containing poisonous ingredients serves both to deter easy access
by children (engineering safety) and to alert the user that the
contents are dangerous (communicating danger).
In short, warning and design claims overlap, To utilize a strict
liability standard for the design aspect of the design defect claim
and a negligence standard for the warning aspect of the same
design defect claim is ludicrous, because both aspects will present the same after-acquired knowledge issue. Thus, there is
simply no intellectually honest way to split them asunder.
Again manufacturers confront distinctions that lack comprehensibility. They are legitimately confused as to just what the
law demands of them. At the adjudicative level, courts have saddled themselves with inconsistent doctrine. Translating this doctrine into jury instructions seriously compounds the problem.
One can only imagine how jurors would react to an instruction
based on the Carter opinion. The instruction would probably
read as follows: 72
The plaintiff alleges that the asbestos supplied by the
defendant was defectively designed. In deciding whether
the asbestos was reasonably safe for use you are to consider that the supplier had knowledge of the dangers attendant to the use of asbestos even though at the time of
manufacture it was not reasonably foreseeable that such
danger existed.
The supplier's liability does not rest upon what he
knew or should have known when he manufactured or
sold the product; it rests on his placing into the stream of
commerce a product which is determined at trial to have
been dangerous. The damaging event may not have been
reasonably foreseeable at the time of the manufacture or
sale because the dangerous factor of the product might
not then have been even reasonably knowable. The supplier would thus be free of culpability, but a price of his
72. This instruction is the author's. The second paragraph comes from Carter, see
infra note 73.
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doing business is to protect people from danger from his
product-or to pay. 73
The defendant claims that his product met the state of
the art at the time the product was manufactured and
distributed for sale. If you find that the product met the
standards of technology existing from 1942-1946 or that
to have altered the design would not have been economically feasible, then the defendant is not liable. However,
if a warning was technologically possible and economically feasible in the years 1942-1946, then defendant is
liable whether or not it was able to foresee the dangers
against which it was to warn. The fact that the danger
was unforseeable does not prevent the manufacturer
from being held liable. Technological and economic feasibility if relevant go only to the ability to warn against
danger, not whether the defendant was aware of the
danger.
The proposed instruction would probably not only confuse a
jury but would also call into question the sanity of a court that
ordered the jury to decide an actual dispute utilizing its guidelines. Something has to give. The law should either adopt true
strict liability or negligence in both design and failure-to-warn
cases. The present schizophrenia in the law must come to an
end.

D.

A Rational Solution-Negligence for Design and Failureto-Warn Claims

The time has come to make negligence the sole test for all
product liability cases in· which the claim is defective design or
failure to warn. As in other negligence cases, ,yet unlike the
Barker strict liability, risk-utility approach, the burden of proof
on the issue of negligence should remain with the plaintiff. In
this regard, the goals of S. 44 and its predecessor bills 74 were
fully justified. The bills' faults occurred rather in the language
they utilized to execute their intent. Instead of relying on classical language to give expression to the negligence concept, the
bills created new language and definitions that would require
73. This paragraph is cited in Carter, 557 F. Supp at 1319. It is taken from General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977).
74. See supra note 2.
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years of interpretation before courts would agree on their meanings. 76 Furthermore, the drafters added section upon section to
75. For the use of new language applicable to the liability standard, see, e.g., H.R.
5626, supra note 2:
SEC.5(a) In any product liability action based upon the formula or design of a
product, the defendant shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence, in addition to other facts required to be proved
under State or Federal law (including other provisions of this Act)(1) that the formula or design of the product was the immediate, physical and producing cause of the injury or damage of which the plaintiff complains; and
(2) that an alternative formula or design meeting the requirements of
subsection (b) was(A) available at the time of manufacture; and
(B) would have avoided or reduced the injury or damage ·of which
the plaintiff complains.
(b) A formula or design shall be considered to be an alternative for purposes
of this section only if it(1) (A) Provides overall safety as good as, or better than, the overall
safety of the formula or design of the product in question; and
(B) provides better safety as to the particular hazard which allegedly caused the injury or damage.
H.R. 5214, supra note 2:
SEC.5(a)(l) In any products liability action brought against a manufacturer for
harm allegedly caused by a product, the manufacturer shall be liable to a
claimant only if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence(A) that the product was unreasonably dangerous(ii) in design, under subsection (c), and that the manufacturer was negligent in selling the product in such
condition;
(iii) because the manufacturer failed to provide adequate
warnings or instructions, under subsection (d), and that
the manufacturer was negligent in failing to provide such
information; or
(B)

(C)

(b)

that the unreasonably dangerous aspect of such product was
the proximate cause of the harm complained of by the claimant; and
that the particular product unit which allegedly harmed the
claimant was manufactured by the defendant.

A product shall be considered unreasonably dangerous in construction
only if it is determined that, when the product left the control of the
manufacturer, the product deviated in a material way(1) from the design specifications or performance standards of the manufacturer; or
(2) from otherwise identical units of the same product line.
(c)(l) Except as provided in paragraph (4), a product shall be considered unreasonably dangerous in design only if it is determined that the manufacturer
failed to adopt an alternative design that(A) was available to the manufacturer when the product was
designed, under paragraph (2);
(B) was on balance better than the chosen design, under paragraph (3); and
(C) would have prevented the claimant's harm.
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An alternative design shall be considered available to the manufacturer when the product was designed if the alternative design was
known at that time or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
been known by the manufacturer to exist and to be feasible for use
in the product by the manufacturer.
(3) An alternative design shall be considered better than the manufacturer's design if the alternative design(A) was significantly safer than the chosen design. The alternative
design was safer than the chosen design if the alternative de~
sign would have provided both(i) better safety than that of the chosen design as to the
particular hazard which allegedly caused the claimant's
harm; and
(ii) better overall safety than that of the chosen design. The
overall safety of the alternative design is better if the
hazards it eliminates are greater than any new hazards it
creates for any persons and for any uses;
(B) was not more expensive than the chosen design, unless the
added safety benefits of the alternative design were significantly greater than the added expense;
(C) was not less useful or desirable than the chosen design, unless
the added safety benefits of the alternative design were significantly greater than the losses of usefulness or desirability;
and
(D) was not in violation of any statute, regulation, or mandatory
safety standard of Federal or State government.
(4) A product shall not be considered unreasonably dangerous in design
where the claimant's harm resulted from(A) a manner of use of the j)roduct other than that which would
be reasonably expected of an ordinary person who is likely to
use the product; or
(B) an alteration or modification of the product other than that
which would be reasonably expected of an ordinary person
who is likely to use the product.
S. 44, supra note 2:
SEC.4(a) In any product liability action, a manufacturer is liable to a claimant
if(1) the claimant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that(B) the product was unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation, as defined in section 5(b);
SEC.5(b) A product is unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation if, at
the earlier of the time of manufacture or Government certification of the product, a reasonably prudent manufacturer in the same or similar circumstances
would not have used the design or formulation that the manufacturer used.
For new definitional standards, see, e.g., H.R. 5626, supra, note 2:
SEC.3(6) The term "product" means any tangible article (including attachments, accessories, and component parts of such articles) and the term "product unit" means any single item or unit of a product.
H.R. 5214, supra note 2:
SEC.8(4) The term "product" means any object which is capable of delivery
either as an assembled whole or as a component part and is produced for introduction into trade or commerce. Such term does not include human tissue,
organs, or human blood and its components.
SEC. 8(7). The term "harm" means (A) damage to property other than the
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qualify the negligence test and limit its application. 76
product itself; (B) personal physical injuries, illness, or death; or (C) pain or
mental harm resulting from such personal physical injuries, illness, or death.
The term "harm" does not include commercial loss.
SEC. 8(11). The term "feasible" means practicable within the technical and
scientific knowledge which is available, adequately demonstrated, and economically feasible for use by a product seller at the time of manufacture of a
product.
S. 44, supra note 2:
SEC. 2(5). "harm" means (A) physical damage to property other than _the
product itself; (B) personal physical illness, injury, or death of the claimant; or
(C) mental anguish or emotional harm of the claimant caused by the claimant's
personal physical illness or injury; "harm" does not include commercial loss;
SEC. 2(8). "practical technological feasibility" means the technical, medical,
and scientific knowledge relating to the safety of a product which, at the time
of production or manufacture of a product, was developed, available and capable of use in the manufacture of il product, and economically feasible for use
by a manufacturer.
76. H.R. 5626, supra note 2:
SEC. 5(c). In any product liability action based upon the formula or design of
a product, the defendant shall not be liable for that portion, including the
whole, of the personal injury, death, or property damage complained of which
could have been avoided or reduced by the attachment to, inclusion in, or use
with the product of an additional safety or protective device or substance, if
the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of
manufacture(!) the product was suited to more than a single function or manner of
use;
(2) the attachmeiit, inclusion or use of such additional device or substance would have been inappropriate or incompatible with a function or manner of use to which the product was suited;
(3) such additional device or substance was known or should have been
known to be available for purchase or use by the person injured or
damaged or by such person's employer;
(4) the person injured or damaged or such person's employer did not
purchase or use such additional device or substance; and
(5) the use of such device or substance would have enabled the person
injured or damaged to avoid or reduce the personal injury, death, or
property damage of which the plaintiff complains.
(d) In any product liability action based upon the formula or design of a
product, the defendant shall not be liable if the defendant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the product formula or design complied with mandatory standards or regulations adopted by the Federal
Government which were applicable to the product at the time of manufacture and which pertained directly to the hazard of which the plaintiff
complains.
H.R. 5214, supra note 2:
SEC. 7(a). In any product liability action for harm allegedly caused by a
product(!) if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the
aspect of the product or its use of which the claimant complains
failed to comply with applicable mandatory Federal or State government safety standards existing at the time of manufacture and
pertaining directly to that aspect of the product or its use, the
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My proposed legislation makes adoption of the negligence
standard simple and straightforward. This adoption of a negligence test would affect existing law in a number of ways. It
would replace some of the concepts courts presently use and effectively overrule certain precedents. First, courts could no
longer apply the consumer expectation test as the sole liability
standard in a design defect or failure-to-warn case. 77 Second, the
claimant shall be deemed to have satisfied the proof requirements of
section 5(a)(l)(A) or 6(a)(l)(A) with respect to such aspect of the
product or its use unless the product seller proves by clear and con•
vincing evidence that its failure to comply with such standards was
a reasonably prudent course of conduct under the circumstances;
and
(2) if the product seller proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
the aspect of the product or its use of which the claimant complains
complied with applicable mandatory Federal or State government
safety standards existing at the time of manufacture or thereafter
and pertaining directly to that aspect of the product or its use, the
claimant shall be deemed to have failed to satisfy the proof requirements of section 5(a)(l)(A) or 6(a)(l)(A) with respect to such aspect
of the product or its use unless the claimant proves by clear and
convincing evidence that such standards were unsound.
S. 44, supra note 2:
SEC. 5(b). A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation
unless(1) the manufacturer knew or, based on knowledge which was reasonably accepted in the scientific, technical, or medical community for
the existence of the danger which caused the claimant's harm,
should have known about the danger which allegedly caused the
claimant's harm; and
(2) a means to eliminate the danger that caused the harm was within
practical technological feasibility.
77. The following cases are illustrative of the diversity of jurisdictions that have expressed their liability standard in consumer expectation terms: Burce v. Martin-Marietta
Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that plaintiff must show that the product
was dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer at the time of manufacture); Vineyard v. Empire Mach. Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 505, 581 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1978)
(finding that the alleged defect must make the product dangerous "to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer") (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) or TORTS § 402A comment (i) (1965)); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 230 Kan. 643,
641 P.2d 353 (1982) (rejecting two-prong Barker test in favor of single test of consumer
expectations); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456,467,424 N.E.2d
568, 577 (1981) (holding that "product will be found unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond the expectations of an ordinary consumer"; reciting to the
first prong of the Barker test and comment (i)); see, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248
Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool
Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975). In addition, a number of courts have
adopted the two-prong Barker test discussed supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text,
and these cases would also be overruled by the proposed legislation. See, e.g., Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979); Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32
Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20
Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio
St. 2d 460, 436 N.E.2d 814 (1982).
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defendant would not carry the burden of proving that its product was not defective. 7 8 The burden of proof for negligence
would reside with the plaintiff. Third, the defendant would not
be liable for information concerning dangers that it could not
have reasonably foreseen at the time it distributed the product'9
or for the implementation of design changes that were not economically or technologically feasible at the time of distribution
of the product. 80 Rather, the plaintiff would have to establish
the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff would be free to
prove that at the time of product distribution the defendant either knew or should have known about the danger or the design
alternative that could have avoided a known danger. At the
same time, all claims of negligence for post-distribution failure
to warn or failure to recall would remain in place. Finally, a
plaintiff could not admit evidence of post-distribution product
modification in those jurisdictions that adhere to the subsequent
repair rule in negligence cases. 81 Because the subsequent repair
rule is almost universally accepted, it would ipso facto become
the governing national rule in product liability design defect and
78. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225
(1973), generated much debate on the relative benefits of burden shifting, see infra text
accompanying note 91, and is generally criticized. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 9, at
605-09; Henderson, Defective Product Design, supra note 9, at 782-97; Schwartz, supra
note 19, at 464-71; Wade, supra note 9, at 573-75. Moreover, in the seven years since
Barker was decided, only one state has seen fit to follow Calfornia's approach. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (placing burden of proof on the
defendant to establish that the benefits of the challenged design outweigh its inherent
risk of danger).
79. Although the majority of jurisdictions presently apply a negligence standard in
the failure-to-warn case, the proposed statute would overrule a number of decisions. See
supra notes 67-68.
80. Applying a negligence test to the issue of technological and economic feasibility
will probably change existing law significantly. As noted earlier, see supra notes 45-46,
many states have specifically enacted "state of art statutes." Others have accomplished
the same result by judicial decision. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463
A.2d 298 (1983); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). Admittedly, "state of the art" is sometimes formulated as a defense. See authorities cited
supra notes 45-46. However, the posturing of risk-utility consideration as a defense is
procedurally awkward. See discussion supra notes 25-26. Placing the burden of proof of
the negligence issue on the plaintiff should simplify litigation considerably.
81. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975) (evidence of subsequent remedial measures admissible for any relevant purpose in strict liability and inadmissible in negligence; court construing exclusionary rule which had no exceptions); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App.
3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251 (S.D. 1976)
(admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability for any relevant
purpose; case simply rubbersstamps Ault); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 648 P.2d
519 (Wyo. 1982) (admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability
for any relevant purpose; exclusionary purposes of Wvo. R. Evm. 407 applies only to
cases of negligence).

SPRING

1985]

Model Product Liability Bill

605

failure-to-warn cases. 82
The proposed legislation will not, however, address production
defect cases. Jurisdictions almost universally agree that strict liability governs these cases. 83 Following the good-sense rule that
"If it ain't broke, don't fix it," there is no need to add definitional problems and legislative verbiage that could constrict the
ability of courts to act on product defect questions that have yet
to surface. 84
Despite my rejection of the consumer expectation test in this
82. Soo Hoo & Soo Hoo, Evidence of Subsequent Repairs: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow, 9 U.C.D. L. REV. 421 (1976); Annot., 74 AL.R. 3d 1001, 1014-15 (1976); 29 AM.
JuR. 2d Evidence § 275 (1967).
83. See Phillips, Synopsis of the Developing Law, supra note 39, at 344-45; MUPLA
§ 104(A), supra note 2. But see ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-683 (Supp. 1980):
In any product liability action, a defendant shall not be liable if the defendant
proves that any of the following apply:
1.
The defect in the product is alleged to result from inadequate design or fabrication, and if the plans or designs for the product or the
methods and techniques of manufacturing, inspecting, testing and
labeling the product conformed with the state of the art at the time
the product was first sold by the defendant;
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1.5-4 (1983) (West Supp. 1985):
(a) The defenses in this section are defenses to actions in strict liability in
tort....
(b) With respect to any product liability action based on strict liability in
tort: ....
(4) When physical harm is caused by a defective product, it is a defense
that the design, manufacture, inspection, packaging, warning, or labeling of the product was in conformity with the generally recognized state of the art at the time the product.was designed, manufactured, packaged, and labeled.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2945-.2946 (West Supp. 1983):
Sec. 2945. As used in sections 2946 to 2949 and section 5805, "products liability action" means an action based on any legal or equitable theory of liability
brought for or on account of death or injury to person or property caused by or
resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formula, development of
standards,·preparation, processing, assembly, inspection, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing, advertising, packaging, or labeling of a
product or a component of a product.
Sec. 2946. It shall be admissible as evidence in a products liability action that
the manufacture, construction, design, formula, development of standards,
preparation, processing, assembly, inspection, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing, advertising, packaging or labeling was done pursuant to the generally recognized and prevailing nongovernmental standards in
existence at the time the product was sold or delivered by the defendant to the
initial purchaser or user.
These statutes are troublesome because they appear to recognize the state-of-the-art defense, and therefore negligence theory, in manufacturing defect cases. Nonetheless, I
know of no decision refusing to apply strict liability in a production defect case. Thus, no
need exists to legislate in an area where the courts are having no problems.
84. For potential litigation problems that a statutory provision mandating strict liability in production defect cases would affect, see Twerski, supra note 26, at 419-21.
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proposed statute, I will admit to some misgivings in abolishing
it. In a lengthy article, I argued that with proper judicial oversight the consumer expectation test could fill a void in the law. 811
The consumer expectation test could address the problem of
overzealous advertising that creates expectations yet falls below
the threshold necessary to establish an action in express warranty or misrepresentation. 86
.
Nonetheless, I am now convinced that risk-utility balancing
provides the only viable test for liability. Campbell v. General
Motors Corp. 87 gives evidence that courts will probably not place
sensible limitations on the consumer expectation test. Indeed,
once the courts have a common law liability standard in torts
litigation, they have an inclination to automatically make the issue one for the jury.88 Furthermore, as Professor Schwartz has
noted, the negligent failure-to-warn claim covers a good bit of
conduct that the consumer expectation test would cover. 89 In
this imperfect world, we must make choices. A simple and easily
understood rule will ultimately bring about greater justice and
fairness than a substantively superior one that trial judges and
juries would probably mishandle.
My proposal's placement of the burden of proof on the plaintiff runs counter to Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. 90 In that
case, the court shifted the burden of proof on risk-utility to the
defendant because the defendant was in a better position than
the plaintiff to prove that the alternatives suggested by plaintiff
were impractical or uneconomical. 91 Although this position has
merit, the burden shifting makes it close to impossible for a defendant to obtain a directed verdict in a frivolous case. The adage that "he who bears the burden of proof never gets a directed
verdict" is essentially accurate. No product liability system
85. See Twerski, supra note 16.
86. Id. at 897-901.
87. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
88. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEEToN, THE LAW OF TORTS§ 37 (5th ed. 1984).
89. Professor Schwartz is generally critical of the Barker court's creation of an independent consumer expectations prong. See Schwartz, supra note 19, at 475-81. In his
thesis, he questions the weight given to "affirmative" statements that fall short of misrepresentation and express warranty. Compare supra note 19. Schwartz further observes
that in many cases a negligent failure-to-warn claim will subsume the consumer expectations test. As he explains, "negative" communications in the form of warnings about the
product's dangers optionally serve to lower reasonable expectations about function and
safety. Id. at 476. Therefore, in cases where an effective warning corrects misimpressions,
or, in the alternative, where the fact finder is convinced that an appropriate warning
would have served this function, no need exists for an independent consumer test.
90. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
91. Id. at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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should permit meritless cases to proceed to jury verdict. The
only available judicial screening devices to prevent jury lawlessness are the motions for directed verdict or the motion notwithstanding the verdict. These devices become a dead letter when
the defendant bears the burden of proof.
The issue of the imputation to the defendant of after-acquired
knowledge has been blown well out of proportion. With state-ofthe-art defenses well in place in most jurisdictions, courts will
not hold defendants liable for technological changes that they
could not reasonably have attained at the time they distributed
the product. 92 Most of the courts that claim to apply strict liability for dangers or risks attendant to the use of a product are
not prepared to impose liability for information that the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen at the time of distribution.93 At best, the plaintiff may impute to the defendant information available at the time of distribution without having to
prove the defendant's negligence in failing to obtain that information. Because, however, courts generally hold the defendant
to the standard of an expert in the particular industry,94 if the
information was available at the time of distribution, then the
plaintiff should have little difficulty in convincing a jury that the
defendant could have reasonably foreseen it.
It is interesting to note that in the most heralded product liability cases of the decade, DES and asbestos, courts relied for
the most part on negligence grounds. H In fact, in many of the
92. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
93. Courts treat failure to warn as either an aspect of a product's design or as an
independent basis of liability. When given the latter status, they read the "duty to warn"
literally and generally do not expect the manufacturer to ~arn of unknown or unforeseeable risks. See Wade, supra note 29, at 747 & n.52; see also cases cited in supra notes 6768.
94. As Dean Prosser noted, when liability is predicated on negligence, the manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert in his field. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96
(4th ed. 1971); see, e.g., Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 159 (8th
Cir. 1975); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973);
Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1968); McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 203, 241 N.W.2d 822, 830 (1976);
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 452, 479 A.2d 374, 386 (1984); Seward v.
Natural Gas Co., 11 N.J. Super. 144, 78 A.2d 129 (1950), rev'd on other grounds, 8 N.J.
45, 83 A.2d 716 (1951); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.4 (1956).
95. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132 (DES), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories., 386 Mass.
540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982) (DES); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d
20 (DES), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 123 (1984); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571,
436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (DES); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestos), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Starling v. Seaboard C.L. R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (asbestos); Aguilar v.
Johns-Manville Corp., No. 400769 (San Diego Cty. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1981) (refusing to
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asbestos cases plaintiffs recovered punitive damages, indicating
that these plaintiffs established not only fault but grievous fault
as well. 96 Moreover, the same court that decided Beshada has
unwittingly embraced the section 402A comment (k) 97 exception
exempting drugs from strict liability. 98 The use of after-acquired
knowledge had potential for the greatest impact in the drug field
because drugs tend to have a long latency period and side effects
apply Sindell in an asbestos case) (order without opinion).
96. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982) (upholding $500,000 award on appeal); Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (awarding $343,000 punitive damages against Johns-Manville and
$95,000 punitive damages against Celotex, another asbestos manufacturer); Hansen v.
Johns-Manville Corp., No. G-79-124 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ($1,000,000), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 734 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) (allowing award of punitive damages but reducing
amount to $300,000).
97. See infra note 137 for the full text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment (k) (1965).
98. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984). In Feldman
the New Jersey Supreme Court opened its opinion by expressly rejecting the blanket
application of the § 402A comment k unavoidably unsafe product exception to prescription drugs. The court wrote that "drugs, like any other products, may contain defects
that could have been avoided by better manufacturing or design. Whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe should be decided on a case-by-case basis.... " Id. at 447, 479 A.2d at
383. The court further stated that comment k would not eliminate strict liability for
failure to provide a proper warning even if a prescription drug were found to be unavoidably unsafe. Id.
Noting that Feldman involved a strict liability, failure-to-warn cause of action, the
New Jersey Supreme Court next discussed the difference between the negligence and
strict liability theories:
This difference between strict liability and negligence is commonly expressed by
stating that in a strict liability analysis, the defendant is assumed to know of the
dangerous propensity of the product, whereas in a negligence case, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant knew or should have known of the danger.
Id. at 450, 479 A.2d at 385. The court stated that the issue in strict liability, failure-towarn cases was whether, assuming that the manufacturer was aware of the defective
nature of the product, it [the manufacturer) acted in a reasonably prudent manner in
marketing the product or providing the warnings given. At this point, however, the
court's analysis reveals some confusion. Discussing available knowledge in the defective
warning situation, the court followed the test of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A
comment j (1965), and asked, "Did the defendant know, or should he have known, of the
danger, given the scientific, technological, and other information available when the
product was distributed ... ?" 97 N.J. at 452, 479 A.2d at 386. The court then shifted
the burden of proof to defendant to show that it [the manufacturer) Jacked actual or
constructive knowledge of the defect at the time of marketing.
Because the Feldman court is in effect saying that it will apply strict liability and
assume that defendant knew of the dangerous propensity of the product unless defendant can prove that it did not know and should not have known of the danger, the cause
of action becomes negligence with the burden on defendant to prove no actual or constructive knowledge of the danger associated with its product. Whether a New Jersey
court decides to apply negligence or "strict liability" to a given case involving prescription drugs, the court will be applying a negligence standard to the manufacturer's conduct. Therefore, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965) exemption of drug~ from strict liability enters Feldman through the back door.
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often do not surface until there has been substantial use of the
drug. 00 On the other hand, engineering safety cases rarely involve questions of after-acquired risk knowledge. 100 With those
two major areas adequately covered by the negligence principle,
there exists little need for polluting the legal atmosphere with
strict liability terminology. 101
Unfortunately, a small cadre of courts continues to insist on
saddling a defendant with true strict liability, effectively imposing on the defendant all the risk information available at the
time oftrial. As Dean Wade has demonstrated, however, most of
the policy reasons that support strict liability cut against the
utilization of a "time of trial" standard. 102 I can only conclude
that strict liability language adds little but confusion to the
proper decision in a design defect or failure-to-warn case. It represents the straw man of modern product liability law. The time
has come to return to the normalcy of the well-understood and
easily applied negligence principle.
Finally, there remains the question whether a federal negligence standard would alter the result in O'Brien v. Muskin
Corp. 103 Candor requires one to admit that a court intent upon
accomplishing the result in O'Brien could do so even under a
negligence regime. I would like, however, to make two observations about this problem. First, even under the unwieldy bills
that have been introduced, courts could still reach the O'Brien
result. 104 Second, the imposition of a federal standard would
probably have a leavening effect on state courts. Congress would
be sending the message that the nation feels that courts have
unreasonably expanded liability. 1011 Moreover, the fact that federal courts will be interpreting the meaning of the negligence
standard will also have an inhibiting effect. Although the United
99. See Wheeler & Kress, supra note 69, at 141-43.
100. Id. at 142.
101. See Birnbaum, supra note 9; Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 'Tux. L. REv. 777 (1983).
102. Wade, supra note 29, at 754-56 (1983).
103. 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
104. See, e.g., S. 100, supra note 1, § 5(b)(2)(A) (requiring proof of practical technological feasibility and favorable risk-utility assessment to declare product "not unreasonably dangerous"). H.R. 7000, supra note 2, § 5(c)(l) (setting forth basic risk-utility analysis). But see S. 44, supra note 2, § 5(b) (requiring alternative design as an element of
prima facie case). It should be noted that S. 44 would totally prohibit a plaintiff's recovery no matter how dangerous the product unless an alternative design could be established. As noted in the text this position is hard to justify. See supra text accompanying
supra note 35.
105. Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A
Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 233 (1978-79).
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States Supreme Court will probably not regularly intervene to
bring state and federal courts into line, 106 one cannot disregard
the Court's potential for involvement. State and federal courts
will likely read the federal negligence standard for design and
failure-to-warn cases as a mandate for moderation in this genre
of litigation.

II.

THE CRISIS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Courts and scholars have both extensively addressed the impact of punitive damages on product liability litigation. 107 There
106. See § 9 of the proposed bill. See also S. 100, supra note 1, § 18.
107. The writings of Professor David Owen have been very influential. In his 1976
article, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257 (1976),
Owen gave strong support to the position that punitive damages have a legitimate role to
play in products litigation. In his 1982 article, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages
Against Manufacturing Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Owen, Assessing Punitive Damages], Professor Owen is far more tentative. Although
he still argues for their retention, he points to the potential for serious abuse of punitive
damages. See also Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, nn.1-2 (1983) (comprehensive listing of scholarly
literature).
In Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 113, 121-23, 472 A.2d 577, 582-83
(App. Div. 1984) the court reviewed the case law and noted that the following jurisdictions have allowed for punitive damages in products liability cases: Alaska-Sturm, Rugger & Co., Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981)
(re~olver); Arkansas-Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 ·
S.W.2d 720 (1981) (grain cart); California-Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App.
3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (automobile fuel system); Delaware-Cloroben Chem.
Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d 887 (Del. 1983) (sulfuric acid drain cleaner); Florida-Piper
Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (aircraft part); Hawaii-Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975) (helicopter part);
Illinois-Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982) (asbestos);
Indiana-Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028 (N.D. Ind. 1981) (motor boat);
Minnesota-Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied
sub. nom. Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980) (flammable child's pajamas);
Missouri-Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (idle cam);
New York-Baleno by Baleno v. Jacuzzi Research, Inc., 93 A.D.2d 982, 461 N.Y.S.2d 659
(1983) (hydrotherapy unit); Ohio-Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811
(6th Cir. 1982) (asbestos); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424
N.E.2d 568 (1981) (roll bar on jeep); Oklahoma-Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661
P.2d 515 (Okla. 1983) (asbestos); Oregon-State ex rel. Young v. Crookham, 290 Or. 61,
618 P.2d 1268 (1980); Pennsylvania-Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357
(E.D. Pa. 1982) (asbestos), and Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir.
1973) (prescription drug); South Carolina-Campus Sweater & Sportswear Co. v. M.B.
Kahn Constr. Co., 515 F. Supp. 64 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd per curiam, 644 F.2d 877 (4th Cir.
1981) (roofing material); Tennessee-Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th
Cir. 1976) (charcoal grill); Texas-Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., Inc. v. Daniels, 619
S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (football helmet); Virgin Islands-Acosta v. Honda
Motor Co., Ltd., 717 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1983) (motorcycle); Wisconsin-Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (fuel tank). But see Jackson v. Johns-
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is little need to repeat the arguments pro and con. Two arguments that support the imposition of federal standards controlling punitive damages have, however, received inadequate
attention.
A.

Risk-Utility Analysis and Punitive Damages

Courts have almost exclusively imposed punitive damages in
design defect and failure-to-warn cases. 108 The inadvertent production defect case that occurs because of imperfect quality control rarely, if ever, involves the kind of reckless conduct that
would support punitive damages. Only design defect and failureto-warn cases involve the kind of "conscious design choice" that
permits a plaintiff plausibly to allege that the defendant behaved so egregiously that a court should impose punitive damages. As noted earlier, both design and failure-to-warn cases require the plaintiff to establish that the defendant failed to meet
the standard for product safety that risk-utility balancing mandates.109 By definition, this balancing process requires a conscious weighing of alternative designs and warnings against the
cost of implementing such changes. To inject punitive damages
blithely, without carefully limiting the occasions in which courts
may impose them, threatens the entire structure of product liability litigation.
It is simply unfair to ask defendant-manufacturers to balance
safety, utility, aesthetics, and cost and then to censure them
with punitive damages merely because we disagree with their assessment. It is altogether too easy, after the fact, to dredge up
an in-house memorandum in which the defendant honestly considered cost factors and to utilize it as "smoking gun" evidence
of the defendant's evil intent. As Professor Owen has noted, the
argument that the manufacturer "traded [your] life for a dollar
[in profit]" has great jury appeal.U° Furthermore, if a manufacturer places itself in jeopardy of suffering punitive damages
every time it subjects its risk-utility balancing to scrutiny, one
can expect that documentation will be driven underground. m
Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984) and the en bane decision reversing the
original panel, 750 F.2d 1314 (1985).
108. See cases cited supra note 107.
109. See authorities cited supra note 41.
110. Owen, Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 107, at 11.
111. Id. at 16-19; see also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 41, at 369-72.
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One can say little in favor of relegating important management
decisions to the paper shredder. Courts must exercise heavy control in this emotion-laden area precisely because the issues that
support punitive damages so closely relate to the issues that
support legitimate or marginally erroneous risk-utility decision
making.

B. Punitive Damages and Decision Making
When, in the context of litigation, manufacturers recognize
that they have made design errors or failed to warn about dangers adequately, they are naturally inclined to settle the case. By
and large, experienced lawyers can calculate with some accuracy
the range within which the potential judgment would fall and
are thus able to settle. 112 Discounting for the risk of potential
loss and weighing that risk against the possibility of attaining a
verdict at the higher reaches of the projected range is a process
with which the plaintiffs' bar is extremely familiar. To be sure,
this is not an exact science; rather, it is an art form that operates
within discernible guidelines.
When the prospect of punitive damages enters the picture,
these guidelines disappear. It is close to impossible to negotiate
sensibly with a plaintiff who believes that he can shoot for the
moon. Furthermore, a defendant who believes that the situation
does not call for punitive damages cannot factor their potential
into settlement discussions. To do so is to set a pattern for all
future settlements in countless cases already in litigation or yet
to be brought. In short, unless the situation truly calls for punitive damages, they sabotage settlement negotiations by thrusting
a huge "unknown" into the negotiations.

C. Punitive Damages-A Rational Solution
To bring stability, predictability, and fairness to punitive
damages, manufacturers need clearly articulated standards that
set forth the kind of aggravated conduct for which courts will
impose punitive damages. To ensure that courts control those
standards, a plaintiff should have to prove by "clear and con112. See, e.g., C. BADWAY, EVALUATION AND SETTLEMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY CASES
(1980); N. SHAYNE, EVALUATING AND NEGOTIATING SETTLEMENTS IN PERSONAL INJURY
CASES (1982).
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vincing evidence" that the defendant violated them. The imposition of a standard higher than the "preponderance of evidence"
standard provides the trial judge with a mechanism for rejecting
punitive damages when the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
clearly that egregious fault caused the design error or the failure
to warn. The key is to provide the trial judge with a screening
mechanism to exclude punitive damages from run-of-the-mill
products cases.
The proposed statute thus imposes both a high threshold for
the nature of the conduct that justifies the imposition of punitive damages and the "clear and convincing evidentiary standard" for proving that the defendant breached that standard. It
does not, however, remove the issue from the jury. These safeguards adequately protect defendants. The proposed statute eschews artificial limitations on punitive damages that either impose an artificial cap or prohibit repetitive punitive damage
awards against an individual defendant for the same design or
warning error. 113 Instead, the jury considers these factors in rendering its verdict. The trial judge and the reviewing court may
also consider them in deciding whether the award is excessive.
One can marshall strong arguments in favor of the more radical limitations on punitive damages. 114 I have rejected them for
two reasons. First, tough standards and a higher evidentiary
burden should provide sufficient protection and reduce the problem to manageable proportions. Second, the political realities
dictate a more measured response. Consumer groups have waged
a vigorous attack on artificial limitations on punitive damages. 1 u
To allow a truly malevolent corporation to wash its hands by
paying a sum certain that bears no relation to its bad faith does
not seem fair. Compensatory damages do not eliminate this unfairness because the corporation's malevolence may far exceed
the damages it will have to pay to injured consumers. Indeed,
there may be few actual injuries, or these injuries may be minor;
thus, the corporation may still gain significant profit from the
113. See H.R. 5214, supra note 2, § 11; S. 44, supra note 2, § 12(g) (as amended); S.
REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1984).
The approach suggested herein which seeks substantive limitations on punitive damages but which rejects capping was adopted by the Wisconsin court in Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
114. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 254 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967); see also Jackson v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985) (en bane rehearing).
115. S. 2631 Hearings, supra note 2, at 132, 271 (statement of David I. Greenberg,
Legislative Director, Consumer Fed'n of Am.); S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at
341 (statement of Public Citizen's Congress Watch).
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sale of the product. Sheer luck should not excuse malevolence
where, in fact, it is found to exist. One cannot lightly set aside
these arguments; they have very strong political appeal. Consequently, any attempt to control punitive damages must avoid
the extremes.
III.

THE CRISIS OF CONFLICTING REPARATION SYSTEMS-TORTS
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION

A federal product liability law must unquestionably address
the injustices that result from the conflict between the tort and
the workers' compensation systems. 116 In most states, an employer who pays workers' compensation benefits to an employee
injured at the workplace while operating a piece of defective machinery has a subrogation lien against the plaintiff's ultimate
tort recovery from the product manufacturer.11 7 The employer
retains this lien even if it was primarily responsible for the
injury. 118

The present situation is intolerable. The no-fault workers'
compensation system bears no responsibility whatsoever for the
employers' faulty conduct. By permitting the subrogation lien in
favor of the employer, it does more than protect the workers'
compensation system from tort recovery: it protects workers'
compensation from itself. It does so by benefiting from the tort
recovery system without having to pay allegiance to the principles of the system from which it seeks recovery. The tort system
would not allow the third-party action without inquiry into the
fault of the parties inter se. 119
This problem has substantial significance because employees
implicate employer fault in over half of all employment related
product liability claims. 120 Manufacturers justifiably complain
116.

Much of this discussion is reflected in my earlier article dealing with S. 2631.

See Twerski, supra note 26, at 463-69.
117. See 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 74.00 (1983); see also
Casey, The Relationship Between Products Liability and Worker Compensation-Third Party Rights Against Negligent Employers, 32 FED. INs. CouNs. Q. 23
(1981).
118. See Larson, Third-Party Action Over Against Workers' Compensation Employer, 1982 DUKE L.J. 483, 488.
119. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 88, § 50.
120. INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY: A TECH•
NICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS REPORT 10, 61-66 (1978). According to the study,
plaintiffs implicate employer negligence in 56.3% of all employment related product liability claims. The conclusion that negligence was involved in such a surprisingly high
percentage of claims was based on responses to the following question: "Would the in-
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that under most state rules the most guilty party often walks
away from the lawsuit without contributing anything to the
plaintiff's recovery. Instead, the product liability (tort) system
bears the entire cost of the injury.
At the other extreme, several states have permitted the products manufacturer to join the employer in order to recover contribution based on proportional fault. 121 In these states, the
third-party action has invaded the immunity of the workers'
compensation system. What a plaintiff cannot accomplish
through the direct action against the employer, the manufacturer can accomplish through the contribution action. 122 If there
was wisdom in creating a system immune to full scale tort recovery, then it is hard to justify this end-run that subjects the employer to the same liability.
sured have implicated the employer but for the Sole Remedy Rule?" The answer to this
question, which by inference leads to the conclusion that employer fault was probably
involved, resulted in 50.1 % affirmative and 49.9% negative answers. When the question
was phrased to reflect the percentage of claims with reference to total dollars paid out,
the breakdown was 56.3% affirmative and 43.7% negative. The insured's somewhat
greater likelihoo~ of impleading the employer, but for the Sole Remedy Rule, in the
bigger cases explains this disparity. The 29% larger average payment in cases when the
plaintiff affirmatively answered the question set forth above corroborates this indication.
See id. at 67, Table 10-2.
121. See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N. Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N. Y.S.2d
382 (1972); Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d
437 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978). But see Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors Act § 2, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, § 302 (1979). Professor Larson contends that
the 1979 statu~ would prohibit the result in Skinner because it authorizes contribution
"where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury."
Larson, supra note 118, at 499-500.
122. In Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972), the New York Court of Appeals held that an action brought by the manufacturer
against the employer for indemnity was "very different" than a direct action by the employee against the employer. Id. at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390. While
the latter was barred by the Workman's Compensation Act, the recovery by third party
plaintiff (the manufacturer) was "based on a separable legal entity of rights." Id. The
court could therefore hold negligent employer financially responsible to the manufacturer for the employer's full share of the blame in decedent's wrongful death which,
depending on the jury's findings, would range from no apportionment to full indemnity.
Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
The Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar result in holding that their Workmen's
Compensation Act did not preclude a contribution action by the manufacturer against
the employer. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d
437 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978). Thus, even though the plaintiff employee
could not bring an action against his employer, the third-party plaintiff (manufacturer)
could seek recovery from the employer whose alleged "misuse of the product or assumption of the risk of its use" contributed to employees' injuries. Id. at 15, 374 N.E.2d at
443. But see supra note 121.
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Resolving the Confiict
Subtracting the workers' compensation recovery from the tort
recovery and abolishing the employer subrogation lien present
the simplest method for resolving the conflict between the two
reparation systems. 123 Because it adopts such an approach, the
proposed law would permit the plaintiff to retain the very same
benefits he now enjoys and, at the same time, shift part of the
cost from the manufacturer to the employer where it rightfully
belongs.
One might argue that the proposed statute would accomplish
"mirror image" injustice. 12 • In effect, the fault-based defendant
could shift partial liability for an injury that is entirely the manufacturer's fault to the no-fault system. A moment's reflection,
however, will reveal that this situation breeds little · injustice.
The workers' compensation system, which was established to
provide limited recovery for work-related injury, would, in fact,
be paying for a work-related injury.
To deny the employer who was truly not at fault his thirdparty action may be somewhat unfair. It does not, however, violate basic principles of fairness to recognize that when a no-fault
system operates side-by-side with a fault system, it is best to
permit each system to work separately. 125 Methods exist to assure that only the truly noimegligent employer recovers the full
subrogation lien and that the negligent employer does not recover the portion of the subrogation lien that represents its percentage of fault. 128 These methods, however, would require that
123. This approach was advocated by Professor Richard Epstein in Coordination of
Worker's Compensation Benefits with Tort Damage Awards, 13 FORUM 464 (1978) and
in the AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGISLATION PACKAGE 65-66
(1977). It was subsequently proposed in S. 2631, supra note 2, § 11; H.R. 5214, supra
note 2, § 10; and MUPLA, supra note 2, § 114. It has been enacted in CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-572(r) (West Supp. 1984).
124. See Davis, The Interaction of Worker's Compensation and Products Liability,
TRIAL, Nov. 1979, at 31, 33.
125. This debate is of ancient vintage. See James, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (1941); Gregory, Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1170 (1941). The argument in
favor of the James position is stronger when contribution is being sought across two
different liability systems.
126. See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, supra note 120, at 72-74; Draft Uniform Product Liability Law (UPLL) § 113, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 2996, 3001 (1979). The
MUPLA, supra note 2, § 114, changed the UPLL approach that allowed the manufacturer contribution up to the 81Ilount of the worker compensation lien "where the employer's failure to comply with any statutory or common law duty contributed to the
claimant's injuries." UPLL § 113. The UPLL approach does have some support in case
law. See Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216, 1220 (9th Cir. 1974); Lambertson
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a court try the issue of fault and apportion it between the employer and manufacturer to assure that the employer does not
receive more than his equitable share in the subsequent contribution action. 127 Such an approach would not only increase
transaction costs, it would also present to the jury difficult apportionment questions that relate to the workplace setting
where fault apportionment may be difficult to accomplish. 128
Finally, the proposed statute will preclude a manufacturer
from bringing a contribution action against an employer. This
will assure the immunity of the workers' compensation system.
Although at present only a handful of states provide for such
contribution, the dissatisfaction with the present system could
cause other states to follow the lead of New York and Illinois by
permitting contribution to redress the grievances of manufacturers. 129 The proposed statute resolves the conflicting interests in a
Solomon-like fashion. It enjoys broad-based support from insurers and manufacturers. Consumer groups have no partisan interest in the matter because plaintiffs will retain the full recovery
the tort system grants them. The legislation only affects contribution between the defendant manufacturer and the employer.
If anything, eliminating the subrogation lien should increase employers' care by holding them liable for the workers' compensation share of the ultimate recovery. Consumers and manufacturers should both welcome this nudge toward added safety.
IV.

THE CRISIS OF THE INNOCENT DEFENDANT

Most jurisdictions hold retailers and wholesalers strictly liable
. as sellers of defective products. 130 These retailers and wholesalers complain that for the most part they must ride along as dev. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977).
127. See authorities cited supra note 126.
128. Id.
129. See supra note 122.
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See, e.g., Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965); Hiigel v. General Motors
Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Brannon v. Southern Ill. Hosp. Corp., 69 Ill.
App. 3d 1, 386 N.E.2d 1126 (1978); Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362
(Mo. 1969); Ortiz v. Farrell Co., 171 N.J. Super. 109, 407 A.2d 1290 (1979); Mead v.
Warner Pruyn Div., 57 A.D.2d 340, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1977); Chandler v. Northwest
Eng'g Co., 111 Misc. 2d 433, 444 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1981); Hoffman v. Loos & Dilworth, Inc.,
307 Pa. Super. 131, 452 A.2d 1349 (1982). But see Ellis v. Rich's Inc., 233 Ga. 573, 212
S.E.2d 373 (1975); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965); Walker v. Decora,
Inc., 221 Tenn. 504, 471 S.W.2d 778 (1971).
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fondants in cases in which they bear no ultimate liability. 131
Even if courts enforced judgments against these intermediate
sellers, they would be entitled to full indemnity because they
bear no actual responsibility for the product defect.
The proposed bill permits courts to release the nonmanufacturing seller from the case unless: (1) it cannot assert jurisdiction over the manufacturer; (2) there exists a "reasonable likelihood" that the plaintiff will ultimately be unable to collect a
judgment against a manufacturer; or (3) the plaintiff alleges primary negligence against the nonmanufacturing seller. 132 For all
practical purposes the proposed bill tracks the philosophy of
previous legislative efforts. The most significant change is that
the intermediary remains in the case if there exists a "reasonable likelihood" that the plaintiff will be unable to collect the
judgment against the manufacturer. The previously introduced
bills required a court to determine that the claimant "would be
unable" to enforce a judgment against a manufacturer. Even
with its "reasonable likelihood" standard, the suggested change
creates a potential that an innocent plaintiff will suffer if the
court guesses wrong and insolvency problems develop in the lag
time between pleading and judgment.
Nonetheless, trade-offs are in order. The transaction costs of
keeping a "dummy" defendant in the case are significant. If the
plaintiff can be assured that a court has made a good faith effort
to determine whether trouble is over the horizon, that should be
sufficient. It would simply be unfair to adopt an alternative that
loads nonproductive legal costs on a system that is already
overburdened with them. In essence, the one-in-a-million case
should not govern the law of product liability.

V.

THE CRISIS OF IGNORANCE

Damages provide the critical link between legal rules and the
. behavior of individuals in the real world. Although the fairness
and economic efficiency of our tort system depend upon appropriate damage awards, we have no useful damage award data on
which to evaluate the efficacy of our legal rules. To the extent
we rely on these awards to allocate funds for the development of
safer products, legislators and manufacturers alike cannot con131. S. 44 Hearings (Part 1), supra note 2, at 199 (statement of Dirk Van Dongen,
President, National Association of Wholesalers-Distributors).
132. See infra §§ 4, 5 of the proposed bill.
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tinue to operate under this veil of ignorance.
Consequently, we need a comprehensive study of the actual
facts concerning damages in products liability litigation. It is
time to know which fears are real and which are imagined. Unlike previously introduced bills, this bill seeks no new study of
future legislative alternatives to the present liability system.
Before a legislature undertakes any such initiative, it must know
with far greater precision the dimensions of the problems facing
both consumers and manufacturers. The proposed bill calls for a
thorough empirical study of damages and their effects on consumers and industry. 133

VI.

STATUTORY REFORM-STRUCTURE AND ANALYSIS

The product liability statute that I propose differs significantly from past legislative proposals. To date, congressional
committees have been presented with comprehensive product liability codes that purport to deal with all phases of the cause of
action. 13" They have addressed the following issues: production
defect, design defect, failure to warn, instructions, express warranty, product misuse, product alteration, contributory fault, assumption of risk, unavoidably dangerous products, inherently
dangerous products, obvious dangers, technological feasibility, liability of wholesalers and retailers, joint and several liability,
statutes of repose and statutes of limitation, workers' compensation, punitive damages, and subsequent remedial measures. In
fact, the bill introduced last year attempted to compress two
hundred years of tort case law into twenty-nine printed pages. 13&
Little wonder that it was self-contradictory, ambiguous, and
substantively unfair to both consumers and manufacturers. 136
The legislation I propose does not seek to rewrite the law of
133. This study should address questions such as the following: How much money is
truly sufficient to compensate a seriously injured plaintiff? What, in fact, is the actual
relationship between economic loss damages, and pain and suffering damages in product
liability cases? Is there a difference between damages depending on product category?
Do drug cases draw damages awards that are greater than injuries of comparable severity
arising out of auto defects? Are punitive damages the monster that they are made out to
be? Has the availability of repetitive punitive damages been a significant factor in product liability litigation, and, if so, have such damage awards been unfair to corporations?
What is the relationship between punitive damages and settlement practice?
134. See supra notes 1 and 2.
135. S. 44, supra note 2, § 90.
136. S. 44 Hearings (Part 2), supra note 2, at 481-94 (letter from Professor Aaron D.
Twerski to Hon. Ernest F. Hollings).
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torts nor to legislate in problem-free areas. It does not curb the
courts from developing reasonable case law with regard to issues
that have not yet been fully explored. It eschews the use of convoluted language that seeks to limit traditional fact-finding by
juries. Instead, the proposed federal statute takes dead aim at
the crisis issues. In my opinion, the five topics my proposed legislation addresses constitute the only issues that threaten the integrity of products litigation. Having taken the position that
federal legislation need only respond to those areas that
threaten the integrity of product liability litigation, I will now
explain why I have excluded other issues that previous bills have
included.

A.

Unavoidably Dangerous Product

Many of the proposed bills have provided special exceptions
from liability for the "unavoidably dangerous product". 137 These
sections attempt to rephrase comment (k) to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in more elegant language. 138 In
137. S. 100, supra note 1, §§ 5(b)(2)(B), 5(b)(3); H.R. 2729, supra note 2, §
5(c)(4)(C); S. 44, supra note 2, § 5(C); S. 2631, supra note 2, § 5(C); H.R. 7000, supra
note 2, §§ 7(a), (b).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment k (1965) covering "unavoidably unsafe products" states:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs.
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies,
which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when
it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the
unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of
time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as
there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically
recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that
they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where
the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known
but apparently reasonable risk.
138. See, e.g., S. 100, supra note 1:
Sec. 5(b)(2). A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation
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light of the adoption of a negligence standard for both design
and failure-to-warn cases, there is no need to add a special section dealing with unavoidably dangerous products. It could only
needlessly confuse the courts and complicate litigation.
One need not deny that defendants should not be held liable
for all unavoidable dangers that can result from the use of a
product. Allergic reactions to drugs such as penicillin exemplify
this product category. Still, legislators need not create a special
statutory exemption to absolve penicillin manufacturers from liability. Given the negligence standard that governs all design
and warning cases, penicillin simply does not constitute an unreasonably dangerous product. 189 Its benefits far outweigh its
known risks.
Manufacturers may still have to warn consumers from time to
time about unavoidable risks so that consumers can choose
whether they wish to take the chance with the medication or
suffer the ills that will befall them if they do not take the drug.
None of the proposed bills free the manufacturer of an unavoidably dangerous product from warning about "unavoidable dangers. " 140 Thus, the manufacturer has either reasonably designed
if the manufacturer proves by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the
relevant point in time(B) the harm was caused by an unavoidably dangerous
product. . . .
Sec. 5(b)(3). As used in paragraph (2)(B), "an unavoidably dangerous product"
means a product that, at the relevant point in time(A) is useful and desirable to the public;
(B) has a known but reasonable risk which, in the light of the
state of scientific and technical knowledge at that time, cannot be made safe without impairing the effectiveness of the
product's intended and ordinary use; and
(C) would have been made by a reasonable manufacturer using
that particular design or formulation.
S. 44, supra note 2:
Sec. 5(c). A product is not unreasonably dangerous in design or formulation if
the harm was caused by an unavoidably dangerous aspect of a product. As
used in this paragraph, an "unavoidably dangerous aspect" means that aspect
of a product which could not, in light of knowledge which was reasonably accepted in the scientific, technical, or medical community at the time of manufacture, have been eliminated without seriously impairing the effectiveness
with which the product performs its intended function or the desirability, economic and otherwise, of the product to the person who uses or consumes it.
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment (k) (1965) (quoted supra
note 137).
140. See, e.g., H.R. 7000, supra note 2:
Sec. 7(a). Notwithstanding section 5 or 6, a product seller shall not be subject
to liability for harm caused by an unavoidably dangerous aspect of a product
unless(!) the product seller knew or had reason to know of such aspect
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the so-called "unavoidably dangerous" product (in effect, has
not designed it negligently) or has adequately warned against
the product's danger. Because the proposed bill adequately provides for both contingencies by predicating liability only after
negligence has been established, there is no need for the separate section.

B.

Comparative Fault

In an article dealing with an earlier legislative initiative, I suggested the need to settle the controversy over the applicability
of comparative fault to strict product liability. 1" 1 Even then, I
did not advocate stripping the state courts of the right to decide
in which cases they should reduce the plaintiff's verdict by the
percentage of his or her fault. 142 I now recant my earlier opinion.
Not only is there no need to legislate in this area, I believe that
legislation would likely create havoc.
The comparative negligence revolution is almost complete. At
last count, forty-three states had adopted some form of comparative fault. 143 The vast majority of states that have passed on
and . . .
failed to meet a duty to provide instructions or warnings under section 5 or 6.
See also Twerski, supra note 26, at 430 (discussing S. 2631).
141. See Twerski, supra note 26, at 458-63.
142. Id. at 463.
143. (1) Alaska, Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); (2) Arizona, AR1z. REV.
STAT. ANN.§ 12-1205-09 (Supp. 1984); (3) Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1963 to -1965
(1979); (4) California, Liv. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1975); (5) Colorado, Cow. REV. STAT. § 13-21-406 (Supp. 1984); (6) Connecticut,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-5720 (Supp. 1984); (7) Delaware, DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 10, §
10-8132 (Supp. 1984); (8) Florida, Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); (9) Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976); (10) Idaho, IDAHO CODE§§ 6-803 to -806 (1979);
(11) Illinois, Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); (12) Indiana, IND. CoDE
ANN. §§ 34-4-33-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1984); (13) Iowa, IowA CoDE § 668.3 (1984); (14)
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1983); (15) Kentucky, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d
713 (Ky. 1984); (16) Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2323 (West Supp. 1985); (17)
Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980); (18) Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1984); (19) Michigan, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.2949
(West Supp. 1984); (20) Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1984); (21)
Mississippi, Miss. CoDE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); (22) Missouri, Gustafson v. Benda, 661
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983); (23) Montana, MoNT. CoDE. ANN.§§ 27-1-702 to -703 (1983); (24)
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); (25) Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141
(1979); (26) New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 507:7-a (1983); (27) New Jersey, N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (Supp. 1984); (28) New Mexico, Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M.
682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); (29) New York, N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW AND RULES § 1411 (McKinney 1976); (30) North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1976); (31) Ohio, Omo
REv. CoDE. ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1981); (32) Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 13-14
(2)
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the applicability of comparative fault to product liability cases
have permitted the reduction to take place when plaintiff has
been at fault. 14' In some instances, states have exempted some
particular form of plaintiff conduct from comparative fault. 1411
Nevertheless, these exceptions may, on a case-by-case basis, be
totally justified. Furthermore, no matter how sweeping the language of legislation, courts will find the latitude to carve out exceptions when the failure to do so will result in grave injustice.
There is, however, a more serious problem that militates
against a federal solution. Although four-fifths of the states have
adopted comparative fault, they have differed sharply as to the
preferred form of comparative fault. Sixteen states have adopted
pure comparative fault. 146 The large majority, however, have enacted one of the "modified" forms of comparative fault that permit a plaintiff to recover only if the plaintiff's negligence was
either "not as great as" 147 or "not greater than" 148 that of the
defendant; otherwise, the common law contributory negligence
(West Supp. 1984); (33) Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1981); (34) Pennsylvania, PA.
CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 42-7102 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1984); (35) Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 9-20-4 to -4.1 (1984); (36) South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2
(1979); (37) Texas, TEx. REV. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) (Vernon Supp. 1985); (38)
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 to -43 (1977); (39) Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1036 (Supp. 1984); (40) Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.22.005 to .920 (Supp.
1985); (41) West Virginia, Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d
879 (1979); (42) Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983); (43) Wyoming, Wvo.
STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977). See also Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968); Virgin Islands, VJ. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 1451 (Supp. 1982).
144. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Busch v.
Busch Constr. Co., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118
N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft, 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984);
Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). But see Correia v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 446 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1983); Youngs Mach. Co. v. Long, 692 P.2d 24
(Nev. 1984).
145. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505A (Supp. 1984). There is no right to comparative negligence in favor of any claimant who has intentionally, willfully, or wantonly
caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death. IND. CoDE ANN. § 34-4-33-2 (a)
(West Supp. 1984). "As used in this chapter: 'Fault' includes any act or omission that is
negligent, willful, wanton or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or
others, but does not include an intentional act." See also Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628,
273 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
146. These states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, New York,
Rhode Island, and Washington. See supra note 143.
147. These states include Arkansas, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Nebraska, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. See supra note 143.
148. This list includes Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. See supra note 143.
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rule governs. The federal legislative proposals adopt the "pure"
comparative fault approach in all product liability cases. They
give no attention to how the state and federal systems will interact. If Congress enacted a statute that failed to address the interaction of these two systems, I believe that serious trouble
would follow.
Consider the following hypothetical. Two drivers exhibit negligent conduct that contributes to the collision of their respective
cars. In addition, a brake defect in one of the cars contributed to
the collision. A jury found the following fault percentages:
Driver of Car No. 1 19% at fault
Driver of Car No. 2 51 % at fault
Car Manufacturer 30 % at fault
Under the proposed federal bills that adopt pure comparative
fault, the drivers of both cars could sue each other and the car
manufacturer and could recover the totality of their damages
less the percentage attributed to their own fault. The result in
those states that follow the modified form of contributory fault,
however, would be very different. The driver of car no. 2 bears
fifty-one percent of the fault and thus could not recover anything. Why should his rights change merely because the accident
involved a defective product?
Any attempt to resolve this problem by applying pure comparative fault to one part of the action and modified comparative fault to the nonproduct part is doomed to failure. The case
would take on the character of chop suey. The systems cannot
operate on mix-and-match basis. I conclude that because there
is little to gain and much to lose by federal legislation in this
area, Congress should leave this area of law to the states.

a

C. Misuse and Alteration
The proposed federal product liability bills contain convoluted
and complex language on the issue of product misuse and alteration.149 Courts would likely read the language to the jury verbatim; their instincts of self-defense and protection from appellate
reversal would mandate this practice. Moreover, the misuse and
alteration issues would ultimately raise the proximate cause is149. S. 100, supra note 1, §§ 9(c), (d), (0; S. 44, supra note 2, § 10; H.R. 2729, supra
note 2, §§ 9(b)(5)(A), 9(b)(5)(B)(i), 9(b)(5)(B)(ii); S. 2631, supra note 2, § 10; H.R. 5214,
supra note 2, § 5(c)(4); H.R. 7000, supra note 2, §§ 12(c), (d); H.R. 5626, supra note 2, §§
7, 8.
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sue. 1110 If lawyers have learned anything about the law of torts in
the last century, it is that proximate or legal cause has no simple
verbalizations. 1111 No alternative to good judging exists to resolve
this issue at the directed verdict stage. Once the court gives the
case to the jury, complex verbalizations tend to impede the desired product-the reaction of the community about the fairness
of recovery in the particular case. 162
Finally, no evidence indicates that courts have dealt with the
misuse and alteration issue irresponsibly. By and large, comparative fault principles have operated to reduce manufacturers' liability. m In fact, by imposing pure comparative fault, manufacturers will probably not prevail as often because, in many of the
misuse and alteration cases, plaintiff's fault exceeds the fault at150. For an analysis of the relationship between proximate cause and the misuse/
alteration problem, see Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the
Emerging Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REV. 403 (1978); Vargo,
The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A New Vocabulary With an Old Meaning, 29
MERCER L. REV. 447 (1978); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 88, at § 102.
151. The attempts to capture the essence of proximate cause are legion. See, e.g., A.
BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961); L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); H.L.A. HART & A.
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); W. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS
(1963); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1925); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 435-453 (1965); Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause
and the Rational Allocations of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV.
1.
152. In Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1955), Chief Judge Magruder
presents the clearest articulation of this view.
When an issue of proximate cause arises in a borderline case, as not infrequently happens, we leave it to the jury with appropriate instructions. We do
this because it is deemed wise to obtain the judgment of the jury, reflecting as it
does the earthy viewpoint of the common man-the prevalent sense of the community-as to whether the causal relation between the ·negligent act and the
plaintiff's harm which in fact was a consequence of the tortious act is sufficiently
close to make it just and expedient to hold the defendant answerable in damages. That is what the courts have in mind when they say the question of proximate causation is one of fact for the jury . . . similar to the issue of negligence,
which is left to the jury as an issue of fact. Even where on the evidence the facts
are undisputed, if fair-minded men might honestly and reasonably draw contrary inferences as to whether the facts do or do not establish negligence, the
court leaves such issue to the determination of the jury, who are required to
decide, as a matter of common-sense judgment, whether the defendant's course
of conduct subjected others to a reasonable or unreasonable risk, i.e., whether
under all the circumstances the defendant ought to be recognized as privileged
to do the act in question or to pursue his course of conduct with immunity from
liability for harm to others which might result. . . .
Id. at 611 (citations omitted).
153. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1979); Sun-Valley
Airlines Inc. v. Avco Lycoming Corp., 441 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Thibault v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 801, 395 A.2d 843 (1978); General Motors v. Hopkins,
548 S. W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
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tributed to the manufacturer. In this area, Congress ought to let
well enough alone.

D.

Statutes of Repose and Limitations

The federal legislation that I have proposed does not provide
for a statute of repose. The enactment of a negligence standard
for design and warning cases removes much of the need for a
repose statute. For plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case, they
will have to prove that a reasonable person in the defendant's
position would have acted otherwise. In cases where the time lag
is substantial, the negligence is difficult to establish. Furthermore, political realities caused the drafters to include a long repose period in the draft bill that only applied to capital machinery.1114 Other proposed repose statutes would create exceptions
for the latent injury cases which are the source of so much of the
controversy. ue1
The proposed repose periods can bring little solace to manufacturers. At the same time, they call forth extraordinary opposition from consumers. In the case of latent production defects,
the consumer position has merit. If a plaintiff can establish that
a product was, in fact, defective at the time sold, there is little
reason that the age of the product should serve as a defense.
Because politics preclude the accomplishment of significant protection for manufacturers at the federal level, there is no good
reason to jeopardize important substantive reform for the sake
of so little. There is also much to be said for the experiment of
federalism on this issue. Many states have enacted statutes of
repose, 1116 and it would be worthwhile to monitor the results at
the state level before taking precipitous federal action.
The enactment of a statute of limitation tied to discovery of
injury would represent a real accomplishment. Some of the state
statutes truly prejudice claimants. m If Congress enacts a repose
154. S. 100, supra note 1, § 11; S. 44, supra note 2, § 12; S. 2631, supra note 2, § 12.
155. E.g., S. 100, supra note 1, § 11 (b)(3); S. 44, supra note 2, § 12(b)(3); S. 2631,
supra note 2, § 11(8)(2) (alternate section); H.R. 7000, supra note 2, § 10(5)(2)(8).
156. See, e.g., Alabama, ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (c) (Supp. 1984); Arizona, AR1z. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (West 1982); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031 (West 1982); Illinois,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213(d) (Smith-Hurd 1984). For a more thorough listing of
state statutes of repose, see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 879
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
157. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(b) (1980); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230
(1984). Statutes which run from the time of injury have been narrowly construed. See,
e.g., Fleishman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 62 N.Y.2d 888, 467 N.E.2d 517, 478 N.Y.S.2d 853

SPRING

1985]

Model Product Liability Bill

627

statute, then fairness dictates a balance between it and a discovery statute. States, however, are actively reviewing their statutes
of limitation. uis Many have responded to the very special
problems raised by latent disease cases. 1119 In this area, federal
legislation provides neither salvation for manufacturers nor a
bonanza for consumers and, therefore, Congress should leave
this legislation to the states.
CONCLUSION

A need exists to clarify the law of product liability in several
areas that have reached the "crisis" stage. The bill that I have
proposed would accomplish the following reforms. First, section
four addresses the crisis in standards for liability in defective
design and failure-to-warn cases. It eliminates strict liability
and, instead, judges these cases on a negligence standard. It then
gives the plaintiff the burden of proving negligence. It also discards the consumer expectation test in these defective design
and failure-to-warn cases and prohibits the introduction of postdistribution modification evidence in those states that forbid the
use of such evidence in negligence cases. Finally, it does not hold
manufacturers liable for failing to warn about dangers that they
could not have foreseen at the time of distribution, nor does it
hold them liable for not implementing design changes that were
not economically or technologically feasible at the time of
distribution.
Second, section seven responds to the crisis of standards for
the imposition of punitive damages. It permits these damages
only in cases of reckless disregard of human safety. To obtain
punitive damages, the plaintiff has to establish the defendant's
recklessness by clear and convincing evidence.
Third, section six deals with the crisis in rules for allocating
damages between the tort and workers' compensation systems.
It reduces an employee-plaintiff's product liability claim by the
amount of workers' compensation benefits. It also denies an em(1984); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
158. Courts and legislators have been actively reviewing these policies in which the
statute of limitations bars a cause of action before discovery of the injury. See, e.g., Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981); Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 ·
Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 52-577a (West Supp. 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-213(d)(Smith-Hurd 1984).
159. ALA. CoDE § 6-5-502(b) (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 6-1303(2)(b)(4) (Supp.
1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3303(b)(D) (1983).
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player, or its workers' compensation insurer, any implied indemnity against a manufacturer or seller for a defective product
claim and denies a third-party tortfeasor any implied indemnity
against the employer.
Finally, section five addresses the crisis in the rules governing
the liability of intermediary sellers who bear no responsibility
for product quality. These sellers, namely wholesalers and retailers, are held liable for their primary negligence. They are also
held liable as manufacturers if the plaintiff cannot assert jurisdiction over the defendant or if the court determines that there
is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff would be unable to
enforce a judgment against the manufacturer.
·
These four very short and easily understandable sections contain the substantive provisions that would accomplish these
goals. They should not complicate the law nor confuse juries. It
is time for the adoption of this "moderate and restrained" product liability legislation. 180
VII.

THE PROPOSED STATUTE

A BILL
To regulate interstate commerce by providing
for uniform treatment of selected product liability problems, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repr,esentatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled,
SHORT TITLE
Sec. 1. This Act may be cited as the "Product Liability Act.met
160. I have purloined this phrase from the late Professor Brainerd Currie. See Currie,
The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963).
161. I have taken many of the sections of my proposed bill from bills that have already been introduced. In many instances I have deleted or altered language to fit the
more limited statutory scheme outlined in the article.
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DEFINITIONS
Sec. 2. As used in this Act( I) "claimant" means any person who brings a
product liability action, and if such an action is brought through or on behalf of an
estate, the term includes the claimant's decedent, or if such an action is brought
through or on behalf of a minor, the term
includes the claimant's parent or
guardian; 162
(2) "clear and convincing evidence" is that
measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established; the level
of proof required to satisfy this standard is
more than that required under preponderance of the evidence, but less than that required for proof beyond a reasonable
doubt; 163
(3) "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce,
or transportation (A) between a place in a
State and any place outside of that State;
or (B) which affects trade, commerce, or
transportation described in clause (A); 16"
(4) "manufacturer" means (A) any person who
is engaged in a business to design or formulate and to produce, create, make, or
construct any product (or component part
of a product); (B) a product seller with respect to all aspects of a product (or component part of a product) which are created
or affected when, before placing the product in the stream of commerce, the product
seller designs or formulates and produces,
creates, makes, or constructs an aspect of a
product (or component part of a product)
made by another; or (C) any product seller
not described in clause (B) which holds it162. This provision's source is S. 100, supra note 1, § 2(1).
163. Id. § 2(2).
164. Id. § 2(3).
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self out as a manufacturer to the user of
the product; 165
"person" means any individual, corporation,
company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or any other entity (including any governmental entity); 166
"preponderance of the evidence" is that
measure or degree of proof which, by the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side, establishes that it
is more probable than not that a fact occurred or did not occur; 167
"product" means any object, substance,
mixture or raw material in a gaseous, liquid or solid state which is capable of delivery itself, or as an assembled whole in a
mixed or combined state or as a component
part or ingredient, which is produced for introduction into trade or commerce, which
has intrinsic economic value, and which is
intended for sale or lease to persons for
commercial or personal use; 168
"product seller" means a person who, in the
course of a business conducted for that purpose, sells, distributes, leases, installs,
prepares, blends, packages, labels, markets, repairs, maintains, or otherwise is involved in placing a product in the stream of
commerce; 169
"State" means any State of the United
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, and any other territory
or possession of the United States, or any

165. Id. § 2(7).
166. Id. § 2(8).
167. Id. § 2(10).
168. Id. § 2(11). My bill excludes human tissue, blood, or organs. The reason for this
exclusion is that the bill does not deal with production defects. This obviates the need
for a specific exclusion of this problem from the product liability legislation.
169. Id. § 2(12). Because my proposed bill does not purport to be a comprehensive
product liability code, the exclusions from coverage present in S. 100 and predecessor
bills need not be dealt with.
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political subdivision thereofP 0
PREEMPTION OF OTHER LAWS
Sec. 3(a). This Act supersedes any State law regarding recovery for any loss or damage caused
by a product to the extent that this Act establishes a rule of law applicable to any civil action
brought against a manufacturer or product
seller for loss or damage caused by a product. 111
(1) This Act shall not be construed to
waive or affect any defense of sovereign immunity asserted by any State
under any provision of law.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to supersede any Federal law, except
the Federal Employees Compensation
Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1982)).
(3) Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to waive or affect any defense of sovereign immunity asserted by the
United States.
(4) Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to affect the applicability of any provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§ 16021611 (1982)). 172
(b )( 1 )Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to supersede·
(A) any environmental protection
law that authorizes a State or a
person to institute an action for
civil damages,. civil penalties, injunctions, restitution, cost recovery, punitive damages, or any
other form of relief resulting
from contamination or pollution
of the environment, or the threat
170. Id. § 2(15).
171. Id. § 3(b)(l). The preemption clause in my proposed bill is far more limited.
This reflects the more limited scope of the bill.
172. Id. §§ 3(b)(2)(3) and (4).
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of such contamination or pollution, caused by any product defined by State or Federal law as
a toxic substance or waste, hazardous substance or material,
hazardous waste or other contaminant or pollutant;
(B) a right arising under the common law of a State to bring an
action to abate a nuisance or
otherwise protect against contamination or pollution of the
environment, or the threat of
such contamination or pollution,
caused by any product; or
(C) any law relating to a civil action
for loss or damage, cleanup
costs, civil penalties or injunctive relief, if the loss or damage
for which a remedy is sought
was caused by the release into
the environment, or the threat of
release into the environment, of
a toxic substance or waste, hazardous substance or material,
hazardous waste or other contaminant or pollutant.
As used in this subsection(A) "contaminant or pollutant" includes (i) anything defined or
designated as a contaminant or
pollutant under any Federal or
State law, and (ii) any element,
substance, compound, mixture,
or organism which, after release
into the environment and upon
exposure, ingestion, inhalation,
impact, attachment, or assimilation into any organism either directly from the environment or
indirectly by ingestion through
food chains, will or may reasonably be anticipated to cause
death, disease, injury, behav-
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ioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutation, physiological
malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction), or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring;
"environment" has the meaning
given to such term in section
101(8) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(42 u.s.c. § 9601(8) (1982));
"hazardous substance" has the
meaning given to such term in
section 101(14) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. §
9601(14) (1982));
"hazardous waste" has the
meaning given to such term in
section 101(29) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. §
9601(29) (1982));
"law" means any law or authority, whether statutory or common; and
"release" has the meaning given
to such term in section 101(22)
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980 (42
U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1982)), and, in
addition, the term includes any
depositing or placing into the
environment. 173

173. Id. § 3(c)(l). The drafters of S. 100 included these sections to satisfy the states'
attorneys general who were concerned about the possible impact of a federal product
liability act on environmental torts. The exclusions make it clear that environmental
torts are not covered by the Act.

634

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 18:3

STANDARDS FOR PRODUCT DESIGN AND
WARNING
Sec. 4. In any product liability action in which the
claimant alleges that the product is defective because
of improper design, failure to warn, or failure to provide adequate instructions, the manufacturer or product seller shall be liable to the claimant only if the
claimant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the manufacturer or the product seller was
negligent, in that the conduct which brought about the
defective condition of the product resulted from. the
failure to act as a reasonable manufacturer or product
seller under the same or similar circumstances. The
standard of care set forth herein shall govern whether
the action is based on (A) strict liability or absolute liability; (B) breach of implied warranty of
merchantability; or (C) breach of implied warranty of
fitness for particular purpose. Nothing set forth herein
shall prevent a claimant from bringing a cause of action for express warranty or any intentional tort. m

RESPONSIBILITY OF PRODUCT SELLERS
Sec. 5. A product seller shall be treated as the
manufacturer of a product and shall be liable for
harm to the claimant caused by a product as if it
were the manufacturer of the product if(1) the manufacturer is not subject to service of process under the laws of the
State in which the action is brought;
or
(2) the court determines that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against the manufacturer. 176
174. This section is totally new and reflects the author's view of a simple and
straightforward articulation of the negligence standard.
175. This section reflects the goals set forth in § 8 of S. 100, supra note I. It deletes
many of the provisions of S. 100 because this bill does not purport to set forth all the
elements of a product liability cause of action. When § 5 is put together with § 4, most of
the substantive goals of § 8, S. 100 are accomplished. An intermediate products seller
will be strictly liable for production defects (as if it were a manufacturer) if the provisos

SPRING

1985)

Model Product Liability Bill

635

EFFECT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
BENEFITS
Sec. 6(a). In the case of any product liability
claim brought by or on behalf of an injured person entitled to compensation under any State or
Federal workers' compensation law, damages
shall be reduced by the amount paid as workers'
compensation benefits for the same injury plus
the present value of all future workers' compensation benefits payable for the same injury
under the workers' compensation law.
(b) Unless the manufacturer or product seller
has expressly agreed to indemnify or hold
an employer harmless for harm to an employee caused by a product, neither the employer nor the workers' compensation insurance carrier of the employer shall have
a right of subrogation, contribution, or implied indemnity against the manufacturer
or product seller or a lien against the
claimant's recovery from the manufacturer
or product, seller, if the harm arose from
the sale of a defective product by the manufacturer or product seller.
(c) In any product liability action in which
damages are sought for harm for which the
person injured is or would have been entitled to receive compensation under any
State or Federal workers' compensation
law, no third-party tortfeasor may maintain any action for implied indemnity or
contribution against the employer or any
coemployee of the person who was
injured. 178
of§ 5(1) or (2) are triggered. The intermediate seller will also be liable for the manufacturer's design defects, failure to warn, or failure to adequately instruct according to the
provision of§ 4 if the provisos of§ 5(1) or (2) are triggered. Section 5(2) reflects a change
in language which would require a court to determine that there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against the manufacturer. In any event, it should be noted that under § 4, an intermediate seller is liable for
its own primary negligence.
176. This section is an amalgam of language from MUPLA, suprr;z note 2, § 114, and
S. 100, supra note 2, § 10.
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Sec. 7(a). Punitive damages may be awarded to
the claimant if the claimant proves by clear and
convincing evidence that the harm suffered was
the result of the product seller's reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers,
or others who might be harmed by the product.
(b) The trier of fact shall determine whether
punitive damages should be awarded, and
the amount of those damages, if any. In
making this determination, the trier of fact
shall consider:
(1) The likelihood at the relevant time
that serious harm would arise from
the product seller's misconduct;
(2) The degree of the product seller's
awareness of that likelihood;
(3) The profitability of the misconduct to
the product seller;
(4) The duration of the misconduct and
any concealment of it by the product
seller;
(5) The attitude and conduct of the product seller upon discovery of the misconduct and whether the conduct has
been terminated;
(6) The financial condition of the product
seller;
(7) The total effect of other punishment
imposed or likely to be imposed upon
the product seller as a result of the
misconduct, including punitive damage awards to persons similarly situated to the claimant and the severity
of criminal penalties to which the
product seller has been or may be
subjected; and
(8) Whether the harm suffered by the
claimant was also the result of the
claimant's own reckless disregard for
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personal safety. 177
PRODUCT LIABILITY REVIEW PANEL
Sec. 8(a). The Judicial Conference of the United
States shall establish a Product Liability Damages Review Panel (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the "Panel") to conduct the studies
required by this section. The Panel shall consist
of three individuals selected on the basis of their
expertise regarding civil actions and recovery
for loss or damage caused by a product.
(b) The Panel shall conduct an empirical study
of damages in relation to the product liability litigation system. As part of this study
the Panel shall evaluate( 1) the nature and adequacy of damages
in providing recovery for any loss or
damage caused by a product;
(2) the relationship between economic
loss and pain and suffering damages; ·
(3) whether damage awards differ among
product categories and location of
litigation;
(4) whether damage awards for economic
loss, pain and suffering, and punitive
damages differ depending on claimants' economic status, sex, race, or
ethnic origin;
(5) the financial impact on industry and
consumers of punitive damage
awards;
(6) the impact of attorneys' fees on the
product liability system; and
(7) all such other relationships between
damages and the operation of the
product liability system that the
Panel shall see fit to investigate.
(c) The results of the study shall be submitted
to the Congress within 2 years after the
177. This section borrows heavily from MUPLA, supra note 2, § 120. Unlike
MUPLA, damages are determined by the jury.
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date of enactment of this Act.
A member of the Panel who is not an officer
or employee of the Federal Government.
shall be entitled to receive compensation at
a rate of basic pay in effect for grade GS-18
of the General Schedule pursuant to section
5;332 of Title 5, United States Code, for
each day (including travel time) during
which the member is engaged in the actual
performance of the duties of the Panel.
There are authorized to be appropriated
for the purposes of this section such sums
as may be necessary in fiscal year 1985.
Such sums shall remain available until
expended. 178

REVIEW ABILITY
Sec. 9. It is the intent of the Congress that, in
other than exceptional cases, the Supreme Court
of the United States shall not review issues relating solely to the sufficiency of the evidence in
cases arising under this Act which have been finally decided by the highest court of any State.179

178. This section is new and reflects the author's view of the necessity of empirical
data about damages before adequate alternative compensation systems can be proposed.
179. This provision's source is S. 100, supra note 1, § 18.

